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ABSTRACT

This dissertation deals with safety management in shipping. The effect of sustained
economic pressure on shipboard safety and pollution prevention standards has been

briefly discussed in this study. This treatise goes on to explain the role of the human

element in maritime accidents. This study provides an overview of the classical

regulatory environment in the shipping industry. The development of formal safety
management guidelines from a proposal of a member-state at the International
Maritime Organisation has been traced in this dissertation. Spontaneous initiatives of
various organisations within the shipping industry to develop safety, pollution

prevention and quality codes have been delineated.

Recognising the symbiotic relationship between safety management and quality

management, various tenets of quality management and their applicability to safety
management have been examined. A detailed analysis of the International Safety

Management (ISM) Code has been undertaken. In doing so, each requii'cment of the
Code has been separately examined and a method of compliance has been
recommended.

The core of this paper contains details for implementation of the ISM Code by a
shipping company operating tankers. A step-by-step procedure consisting of safety

assessment, development of management controls, implementation of controls,

monitoring and review has been proposed. A framework of the documentation
required has been described and an outline of the contents of the documents has been

suggested.

The dissertation closes with conclusions drawn from the investigations of this study

and makes recommendations on how various players in the shipping arena can
contribute to the successful implementation of the ISM Code.
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1.0

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The first duty of business is to survive and the guiding principle of
business economics is not the maximisation of profit — it is the avoidance
ofloss.
Attributed to Peter Drucker (DNV, 1994)

There is a growing consciousness today among the public about safety, quality and

environmental issues. Shipping, as a service industry, is today expected to provide a
safe, high quality, environment-fiiendly service. The international nature of the

shipping industry makes it necessary for shipping companies to ensure that their
operations fulfil high international standards of safety and pollution prevention.

1.1

Economic Background

The shipping industry is yet to recover from the economic hardships of the 1980s. In
this decade, traditional quality, maintenance and performance standards were
sacrificed to improve profitability. Greater emphasis was placed on cost reduction.

There was a risk of an attendant reduction in quality. When quality is at a discount

safety is usually a casualty. Quality and safety are important instruments of long terra
profits. In order to achieve short term profits the industry was jeopardising its long

term interests.

A change occurred in the profile of ship-owning interests in this decade. This change

was amply evident in the world tanker fleet. Major oil companies and traditional
independent tanker owner-operators who owned and directly operated a large

proportion of the tanker tonnage were retreating from the market. Less-experienced
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speculators and asset players entered the market. Short term profits were the near

sighted goal of these new entrants.

The average age of the existing tanker is high and it is steadily increasmg. The current
economic recessionary environment is a disincentive for shipowners to invest in new

tanker tonnage. At a time when higher attention to the maintenance and upkeep of
existing tankers is called for, some unscrupulous operators resort to “flogging”
existing tonnage. This does not mean that all tankers plying the trade routes are safety

and environmental hazards. Responsible operators endeavour to maintain old tonnage
in peak condition. They practise time-tested maintenance policies and opt for selective

tonnage replacement.

1.2

Shift of Controls

With the development of reliable and efficient ship-shore communication systems it is
possible to contact a ship at sea with very little effort. This efficient communication
link was instrumental in the transfer of controls fi'om ship to shore. Traditionally the
shipmaster took decisions regarding the safety of crew, cargo and ship. He was deeply
involved in the commercial decision-making process for his vessel. The role of the

master diminished with improved communication. Major decisions are made ashore

by the owner or operator and conveyed to the master for implementation by the ship.

In a depressed economic scenario, commercial considerations may take precedence
over safety aspects in the decision-making process ashore. Although the master is still
considered responsible for the .safety of the ship, its crew and cargo, he may find it

very difficult to countermand an unsafe decision taken ashore. The IMO addressed

this problem as early as 1979.

It was realised that however much technology

advances, the human being cannot be eliminated. The man on-the-spot needed to be
reinstated with authority.

IMO Resolution A.443(XI), adopted on 15 November

1979 states:
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Considering that maritime safety and protection of the marine
environment must be the shipmaster’s prime concern in all situations
which arise and that economic and other pressures on the
shipmaster should not at any time interfere with the decisions he

must take in that regard.

Considering further that the decisions on maritime safety and
marine environment protection by the shipmaster should not be
unduly influenced by instructions given by the shipowners,
charterers or others concerned.

Invites Governments to take necessary steps to safeguard the
shipmaster in proper discharge of his responsibilities in regard to
maritime safety and the protection of marine environment by
ensuring that:

(a)

The shipmaster is not constrained by the shipowner,

charterer or any other person from taking in this respect any
decision which, in the professional judgement of the

shipmaster is necessary;

(b)

The shipmaster is protected by appropriate provisions,

including the right of appeal, contained in, inter alia,

national legislation, collective agreements or contracts of
employment,

from

unjustifiable

dismissal

or

other

unjustifiable action by shipowner, charterer or arty other

person as a consequence of the proper exercise of his

professional judgement.

This Resolution never achieved the status of an international regulation. Although the

master’s responsibility in matters concerning maritime safety and protection of the
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marine environment was accepted, his authority to countermand any decision taken
ashore by the owner/operator, which may be detrimental to safety at sea and
protection of the marine environment, was not explicit. These facts led inexorably to

the conclusion that there was a need for regulatory controls upon the owner/operator

in matters concerning safety at sea and environment protection.

1.3

Regulatory Environment

Hie IMO Conventions, Classification Rules, Flag State Laws and Port State Laws
have in the past addressed matters of construction, equipment and operation of oil

chemical and gas tankers.

Safety and pollution prevention are paramount

considerations in these regulations. Yet tanker accidents occur. There is loss of life,
damage to environment, ship, cargo and property. Every major tanker disaster results

in public outcry and a demand for l^jslafive and regulatory measures to prevent the
recurrence of such an event. As a result, new laws are promulgated and applicable

rules are amended.

A catastrophic maritime incident is just the tip of the iceberg. It reveals very little if

treated as an isolated incident. Every such incident is a pointer to the existence of
scores of unpublicised minor incidents and hundreds of near misses.

The classical path adopted by regulatory bodies to remedy circumstances which cause

a maritime disaster, is to impose more stringent construction and equipment
requirements and to prescribe modifications to shipboard operational practices. This

line of action bespeaks of a tendency to believe that accidents are caused exclusivdy
by technics factors and it is technical causes which need to be remedied. However,
statistical analyses reveal a contrary picture. The cause of only 20% of all shipping

accidents is technical-related. The cause of an overwhelming majority of 80% of all
maritime accidents is said to be human-related.

4

Human Element in Maritime Accidents

1.4

Effective strategies for management of safety and pollution prevention on tankers

must be based on an in-depth understanding of the human element in maritime

accidents. What is an accident? An accident is a chance combination of causes
producing an unfortunate result.

Very often the human element in maritime accidents is loosely termed as ‘human
error’. This terminology suggests a surmise that the human element is a ‘component’,
liable to unpredictable malfunction, in a system consisting of technical elements.
There is also an implied assumption that the sole cause of accident is failure of the

human element ‘component’, instead of it being considered one of the contributory

factors.

It would be more appropriate to refer to the human element as ‘human

factor’ or ‘human-related causes’ than as ‘human error’.

Factors that constitute the human element in maritime accidents have been analysed
by Prof. W. Wagenoar (1993) in his paper on behalf of SIGTTO “Accidents at Sea:

Multiple Causes and Impossible Consequences”. Prof. Wagenoar is of the opinion
that;
Accidents appeared to be the result of highly complex coincidences

which could rarely be foreseen by the people involved. The

unpredictability is caused by the large number of causes and by the

spread of information over participants. Also the nature of errors
that are made indicates a lack of understanding rather than a lack of
motivation or risk propensity. Accidents occur because the
behaviour that causes them is not seen as risky. Errors of

information processing (mostly lack of attention) are made
frequently but are under normal conditions, not punished by
accidents.
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Professor Wagenoar has classified ‘human error’ in accidents at sea into three

categories, namely the cognitive system, social system and situational system. Errors
caused by human information processing, visual illusion, false hypotheses, habits,
motivation, training, personality and fear constitute the cognitive system. The social

system consists of errors caused by social pressures, role and life stress. The

situational system comprises errors caused by physical stress, environmental stress
and ergonomic aspects.

The immediate cause or the triggering factor of an accident may be human-related,

limiting investigations to this level and applying corrective feedback to the system is
the conventional method of achieving safety goals. This method of identifying the

immediate cause of an accident and eliminating each lapse may be termed as the

reactive method. Bromby(1995, 3) warns that ‘we cannot keep on relying upon

accidents to identify unforeseen hazards, and then subsequently ‘strap on* a remedy.’

A holistic approach to safety and pollution prevention will be more effective. This

approach should be pro-active in nature, and it should address the underlying causes
of maritime accidents.

To seek latent causes of maritime accidents it is necessary to trace the causal chain

back to their origins. Organisational lapses are often found at the root of the causal
chain of maritime accidents. The shore management of a shipping company is the lead

player in this stage. Most of the root causes are deficiencies in the shore management
system. The lack of a comprehensive health, safety and operating policy may in some
cases be tire source of the problem. Inadequate implementation of an existing policy is
another contributory factor. Inadequate monitoring of shipboard health, safety and
operations can be a cause. In addition certain intermediate causes such as poor

platmed maintenance, inadequate attention to ergonomics, improper manpower

utilisation and lack of training can compound the chances of an accident.

The

immediate causes (a large proportion of which may be human-related) just serve as
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detonators of an accident caused by a veiy complex combination of intermediate and

root causes. A pro-active approach to safety and pollution prevention will address the
problem at all three levels, namely the root, intermediate and immediate levels.

1.5

Safety Management — Initiatives of IMO

Human element in maritime casualties is not confined to the man on-the-spot but

extends to the shipboard and shore organisation and their efficient management) By
the late 1980s it was widely recognised that safe, pollution-free and efficient ship

operations require good management both ashore and on board. Investigations
following the loss of the Ro-Ro ferry ‘Herald of Free Enterprise’, on 6 March 1987,

revealed a lack of standards in management of safety in shipping.

At the 15th session of the IMO Assembly, in November 1987, the United Kingdom

proposed that it was necessary to develop international standards for safety
management in shipping. This led to the adoption of Resolution A. 596(15) which
recognised that the great majority of maritime accidents are attributable to human-

related causes and that safety of ships will be increased by improving operating

practices. Resolution A.596(15) broke fresh ground by requesting the MSC and
MEPC to urgently develop guidelines concerning shipboard and shore-based

management procedures for safe operation of passenger and Ro-Ro ferries. In early
1989 the tanker ‘Exxon Valdez’ ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling
270000 barrels of Prudhoe Bay Crude Oil into an ecologically sensitive environment..

Even before formal investigations were concluded accusative fingers were pointed at
the evident failings in the safety management systems, both on board and ashore. This

added impetus to the process of development of safety management guidelines by
IMO. Resolution A.647(16), ‘IMO Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation

of Ships and for Pollution Prevention’ was adopted on 19 October 1989. Although
these guidelines were recommendatory in nature, it was a substantial step, by IMO,
towards -encouraging shipping companies to put safety and environment protection
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measures high on their list of priorities, notwithstanding commercial expediency.
Resolution A.647(16) also required the MSC and MEPC to periodically review these
guidelines and consider need for amendments in the light of experience gained.

Recommendations for amendments to these guidelines were made by MSC at its fifty
ninth session and by the MEPC at its thirty-first session. These recommendations
were incorporated into the guidelines. At its 17th session, the IMO Assembly adopted

Resolution A.680(17), the revised ‘IMO Guidelines on Management for the Safe
Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention’, on 6 November 1991. These revised

guidelines were also subject to review by the MSC and MEPC.

The Joint MSCZMEPC working group used these revised guidelines as a basis for

development of the ‘International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships
and for Pollution Prevention’ (ISM Code). The ISM Code was annexed to Resolution

A.741(18), which was adopted by the IMO Assembly on 17 November 1993.

1.6

Safety Management — Initiatives of the Shipping Industry

The beleaguered shipping industry was quick to respond positively to the safety
management initiatives of IMO. Realisation that quality in shipping operations and

profitability were not mutually exclusive, was dawning on the shipping industry. The
tarnished image of the industry was set to improve with an in&sion of quality. (Quality
in shipping operations meant safe, pollution-free, efficient management.

One of the earliest quality management schemes was conceived before IMO
Resolution A.647(16). In 1988, a group of shipmanagement companies, later known

as the Group of Five, embarked upon the development of a comprehensive quality

code for shipping. This code was formally completed on 19 December 1990.
Commitment to safety and pollution prevention was amply explicit in the objectives of

the code. The International Ship Managers’ Association (ISMA) was established on

30 April 1991. The code came to be known as the
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‘Code of Ship Management

Standards of the International Ship Managers’ Association’ (ISMA Code). The main

condition for membership of the association was compliance with the ISMA Code. In

1995, ISMA already had around 40 member companies, who operate an aggregate of
around 1900 seagoing vessels totalling 60 million tonnes deadweight.

In March 1990 the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association published the ‘Guidelines on

Quality Management for Ship Operation’. The purpose of these guidelines was to
provide guidance for the development and implementation of a management system

with regard to safety, pollution prevention and efficiency. The guidelines were
primarily intended for companies responsible for the operation of ships carrying oil,

chemicals or passengers. These guidelines were developed in line with the IMO

Resolution A.647(16).

In 1993, the HELMEPA co-operated with various associations representing Greek
shipowners and seafarers to publish the ‘Voluntary Guidelines on Management for

Safe Ship Operation and the Prevention of Pollution’. These guidelines were based on

IMO Resolution A.680(17).

In the early 1990s, in response to the trend in the shipping industry, leading

classification societies developed safety and quality management classification
services.

The initiative of shipowners and shipmanagers to formulate safety

management standards served as a catalyst to the development of the ISM Code by

the IMO. Chapter 3 will look into the requirements of the ISM Code in further

detail.

1.7

Objective of this study

Safety management in shipping has assumed the proportion of an industry-wide
movement. In this introductory chapter an effort has been made to trace the genesis of

this development which culminated in the regulatory enforcement of the ISM Code.
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Successful safety management systems needs to be based on the tenets of quality
management. In order to understand application of the principles of quality to safety

management, this study will examine various models of quality management and how
they can be applied to shipping operations.

The ISM Code provides a broad framework upon which a shipping company must

base the safety management system for its vessels. This study will analyse the

requirements of the ISM Code. The requirements will be interpreted to establish

details to be fulfilled.

Safety management is a function which is relevant to every class and type of ship.

When developing and implementing safety management systems there are bound to be
elements of a general nature which are common to every ship and trade. There will be
some elements which are typical to a special class of ships. Wherever ship-specific or

trade-specific details need to be discussed, tins study will concentrate upon tankers
and tanker trade. A development and implementation procedure for a safety

management system for tankers will be proposed in this study.

The author is employed at the Maritime Training Institute of the Shipping

Corporation of India Ltd. (SCI). SCI is currently a conventionally managed company

which owns, operates and manages a diversified fleet of over 125 ships (oil tankers,
chemical tankers, gas tankers, passenger vessels, dry bulk carriers, container vessels,
dry cargo vessels, offshore supply vessels^ etc.). The management has decided to
implement the ISM Code at the earliest. It is expected that this dissertation can serve

as a primer to personnel directly involved with the development and implementation
of the ISM Code.
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2.0

SAFETY AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Safety is one of the aspects of quality.
Source: ISO 8402

2.1

Introduction

Safety and pollution prevention are aspects of a ship’s operation that cannot be

addressed in isolation. These aspects permeate all facets of a ship’s operations.
Ensuring safety of personnel, property and environment is an important function of
shipboard and shore-based management. This function directly influences the fitness
for use, operational reliability and contractual performance of the service provided by

a shipping company.

Fitness for use, operational reliability and contractual performance are the key

elements of quality of service. It follows that quality needs to be taken care of in order
to provide safe and environment fiiendly shipping. This opinion is supported by
Bctterill(1994, 3), in his paper ‘The ISM Code and its Relationship with ISO 9002

Explained”. He explains:

Although Safety and Quality have entirely different meanings, they
are both closely inter-related and both depend on Quality of fire

organisation. (Safety Management Systems are 85% of Quality
Management Systems).

A Safety Management System cannot operate successfully without adherence to the
doctrines of quality management. In this chapter accepted models of quality
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management will be examined in order to appreciate their application to ship

operations and shipping companies.

2.2

Definitions

Definitions and interpretations of terms such as “quality”, “quality system”, “safety”

etc. are not uniform. This author has encountered different interpretations of these
basic terms, in various sources such as ISO 8402, Oakland(1989), Larin(1988),
Marsh(1991) and Kuo(1990). It is therefore considered appropriate to define some

important terms here, in order to clarify the context in which they are utilised in this

study:

Quality: the totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bear
on its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs.

Quality policy: the overall quality intentions and direction of an organisation as
regards quality, as formally expressed by the top management.

Quality management: that aspect of overall management function that determines
and implements the quality policy.

Quality assurance: all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide
adequate confidence that a product or service will satisfy given requirements for
quality.

Quality control: consists of checking after the feet that a product complies with
statutory or contractual requirements.

Quality system: The organisational structure, responsibilities, procedures, processes
and resources for implementing quality management.

12

Non-conformity: non-fulfilment of a specified requirement.'

Process: The transformation of a set of inputs, which can include actions, methods
and operations, into desired outputs in the form of products, information, services or

generally results.

Safety: a perceived quality that determines to what extent the management,

engineering and operations of a system are fi’ee of danger of life, property and
environment.

2.3

Concepts of Quality

Quality movement in the shipping industry is of recent vintage. The manufacturing
industry pioneered the quality wave. In its simplest form it consisted of post

production inspection by the customer, of the finished product, to detect and eliminate
products which did not fulfil a predetermined specification. This essentially meant re

working or rejecting the non-conforming product. This process of second party
quality assessment of quality was dubbed as “quality control”. Manufacturing
companies often boast of how they employed rigid quality controls. The redundancy,

waste and consequent additional cost of this process was accepted as the ‘cost of
quality’. This implied that quality was an expensive appendage to the basic
manufacturing system.

The similarities between quality control in the manufacturing industry and the
mandatory and contractual requirements of the shipping industry are easily apparent.

A host of inspections and surveys are carried out by organisations having particular

interest in various aspects of a ship’s operations. Each survey or inspection is intended
to ensure compliance with mandatory obligations or fulfilment of contract. In his

article “Ship Management Standards” (Seaways, November 1991) David Underwood
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1/

comments:
Currently, second-party assessors with whom ship and shore staff
have to deal - and so far the main brunt has fallen upon the ship’s

staff - are:
- Classification surveyors.
- Surveyors looking after the interest of P & I Clubs.
- Surveyors looking after the interest of hull and machinery

underwriters.
- Surveyors dealing with damage claims, e.g. Salvage Association.
- Port State Control Surveyors.

- Flag State surveyors.
- Time charterer’s surveyors.
- Voyage Charterer’s surveyors.

- Potential Charterer’s surveyors.

- Terminal operator’s surveyors.
and last but not least
- Owner’s managers, superintendents, surveyors etc.

This is very expensive and we are seeing the development of an

entire industry which already has major vested interest in ensuring

its own comfort and survival in true parasitic fashion ‘off the back’
of the shipowner.

Achieving quality shipping is undoubtedly the laudable objective of the inspection and

survey regime. The focus of such a quality effort is mis-direeted. IvCUican (1993,35)
observes that ‘in most organisations 90% of the quality effort goes into finding what
is wrong and putting it right, and only 10% into preventing it going wrong in the first

place, an investment in prevention looks the better bet.’

Over-emphasis on surveys and inspection as a quality tool can be counter-productive.
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Quality control in ship operations has traditionally consisted of surveys and
inspections. This means a lot of effort is being directed towards finding out what is
wrong and then setting it right. Instead, 90% of the quality effort should be devoted

to prevention of non-conformities and 10% to quality control. This quality control

should consist of a conformance check or verification during the process and not after
the fact. Oakland (1989, 8) stresses that ‘Quality cannot be inspected into products or
services, customer satisfaction must be designed into the whole system. Conformance
checks then make sure that things go according to plan.’

J- An inspection or survey can certify that an item fulfils a requirement or specification,
at the time of the inspection. This can create a complacent attitude. An inspection

cannot assure continued compliance with requirements. A quality management system

can be employed to ensure continued compliance with requirements and prevent
accretion of non-conformities creating unsafe conditions.

Realising the advantage in the shift of emphasis to prevention, the manufacturing

industry adopted quality assurance measures from the 1980s onwards. Quality
management based upon the precepts of quality assurance establishes a quality system

to manage the process that provides a manufactured product or service. Quality
assurance ‘builds-in’ quality into the product or service. The expense of built-in

quality is offset by the cost savings from minimising quality losses.

Quality assurance soon came to be recognised, by the manufacturing industry, as a

sound management technique to optimise long-term profitability. The ISO 9000 series
Quality Standards, published in 1987, was adopted by the manufacturing industry to
provide quality assurance for their products. Initially, the service industry remained
largely unaffected by this quality assurance trend. Manufacturers, who were the end

users of the road transport services, gradually influenced road transport companies to

adopt ISO 9000 series Quality Standards. The shipping industry was slow to realise
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the advantages of quality assurance. However, by the late 1980s, the first moves to

adopt quality assurance techniques to the shipping industry were made. The ISO 9002
model for quality assurance is the most suitable one for application to ships and

shipping operations.

The ISO 9000 series Quality Standards consists of a series of five documents, namely:
ISO 9000 :

Quality management and quality assurance standards - guidelines for

selection and use.

ISO 9001:

Quality systems - Model for quality assurance in design development.

ISO 9002;

Quality systems - Model for quality assurance in production

installation and servicing.
ISO 9003 :

Quality systems - Model for quality assurance in final inspection and

test.
ISO 9004:

Quality management and quality system elements - Guidelines.

The principal concepts of the ISO 9000 series Quality Standards are that an

organisation should achieve the three objectives specified in ISO 9000:
a)

The organisation should achieve and sustain quality of the

product or service produced so as to meet continually the

purchaser’s stated or implied needs.
b) The organisation should provide confidence to its own
management that intended quality is achieved and sustained.
c)

The organisation should provide confidence to the purchaser

that intended quality is being, or will be, achieved in the
delivered product or service provided. When contractually

required, this provision of confidence may involve agreed

demonstration requirements.

In the context of safety and environment protection management on tankers the term
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‘purchaser’ does not only mean the customer of the transportation service offered by

the shipping company. The term needs to be viewed in a broader perspective. The

Flag State, Port State and society, in general, are all entities with stated and implied
needs to be fulfilled by the service offered by the shipping company.

2.4

Application of ISO 9002 to Ship Operations and Shipping

Companies
ISO 9002 has eighteen elements in its model for quality assurance. These eighteen

elements are;
• Management Responsibility

• Quality System
• Contract Review
• Document Control

• Purchasing
• Product Identification and Traceability
• Process Control
• Inspection and Testing
• Inspection Measuring and Test Equipment
• Inspection and Test Status

• Control of Non-conforming Product

• Corrective Action
• Handling
• Storage
• Packaging and Delivery

• Quality Records
• Internal Quality Audits

• Training
• Statistical Techniques.
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It may be observed that these elements do not readily translate to the context of ship

operations and shipping companies. ISO 9002 was established initially as a standard
for the manufacturing industry. The elements need to be adapted for application to the

shipping industry. When adapting these elements to the shipping industry

consideration needs be given to safety of life and property at sea, safe navigation,

compliance with national and international regulations and customer requirements.

2.4.1 Management Responsibility
This element defines management commitment to the quality process. It consists of

three aspects, namely, quality policy, organisation and management review. The
quality policy should be documented in a policy document,and action taken to ensure
that the policy is understood, implemented and monitored across all levels of the

organisation. Relevant convention and regulations are to be taken into account when

defining quality policy. To ensure effective organisation it is necessary to define the
responsibilities, authorities and inter-relation of key personnel ashore and on board. In
assessing who should be considered key personnel, the degree of authorisation in

which an individual is vested in an organisation, must be given due consideration. This
authorisation includes the authority to take measures to prevent tlie occurrence of a

non-conformity and to identify and remedy a defect.

An organisation chart must depict the relationship of key personnel in the

management system. This chart must be supported by the description of responsibility
and authority of key personnel. Tire levels of competence for various duties in the
organisation rrrust be specified and management should ensure that on-shore and

shipboard personnel have defined competence.

To ensure continued compliance with defined standards of quality a verification

procedure needs to be set up and documented. The preliminary requirement for a
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verification procedure is the allocation of resources and personnel, by the

management, to this activity. Such personnel must be adequately trained to undertake
verification of the elements of the quality model; they must not have direct

responsibility over the area being verified. Verification activity should cover routine
and contingency procedures and equipment.

An individual should be assigned the role of quality manager. This individual must
have defined authority and responsibility for ensuring the management of the quality

system. A shipping company may find it practical to have a shore-based quality
manager to oversee the implementation and maintenance of the quality system. The
ship’s master must be responsible for quality on board and he must manage the

shipboard quality system on behalf of the shore-based quality manager. There must

not be any duplication of authority. Everyone who has a function in the quality system
must be aware of the authority with which he has been vested.

It is recognised that a shipping company functions in a dynamic environment. A static
quality system will be outdated very soon. Management review of the quality should

be routinely carried out. The interval between reviews should not exceed one year,
considering the nature of the shipping industry and its business. The currency of

policy, documentation and manuals utilised in the quality management system must be

reviewed. Ship’s staff and shore personnel must be questioned to elicit feedback.
Findings of audit, analysis of incidents and survey recommendations must all be

included in the ambit of the review. Customers’ opinions, suggestions for refurbishing
the quality systems, changed market, social, regulatory and environmental conditions

must be considered in the review. The review procedure must be documented in

detail.

2.4.2 Quality System
The organisation needs to draw up a quality manual. This manual will describe the
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quality management system and function

as a reference document for the

implementation and maintenance of the quality system. The quality manual should
document details of relevant quality-related procedures and instructions. Areas of

responsibilities and authority must be unambiguously stated in this manual. Defined
procedures must be laid down and key actions must be described. Detailed (written)
work instruction should supplement the procedures. These procedures and work

instructions must take cognisance of national, international and statutory rules and
regulations.

2.4.3 Contract Review
The objective of a contract review should be to ensure that contractual requirements
are adequately defined and documented. Such a review must consider both explicit

requirements and implicit expectations of the ‘purchaser’.

In the concluding paragraph of the previous section (2.3) it was established that the
term purchaser encompasses the customer. Flag State, Port State and society in

general, for the purposes of ship operation and shipping companies. Thus, it is

necessary to review those contractual conditions which are obviously quality-related
(e.g. charter documents, tenders, management contracts etc.) and also those
concerning statutory and safety aspects.

2.4.4 Document Control
It is required that a procedure to control all quality-related documents and data is
established and maintained. An authorised person must check all documents and data
to ensure they are adequate for the intended purpose. Their ready availability for the

conduct of various processes must be confirmed. Documents should include internal
manuals, procedures, plans, rules and regulations, codes and conventions. A process

to update each document must be instituted. Changes or modifications to documents

should originate from the same source that created or provided the document. A
master list or equivalent alternative should at all times be maintained to provide
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consolidated information regarding the status of revision of any particular document.

This will ensure that documents are duly updated and outdated documents are not
used.

2.4.5 Purchasing
The standard requires that all purchased products should conform to specifications.

Specifications should be laid down in the quality manual. Purchased products are
spares, stores, supplies and fuel. This element should also cover any service which the

organisation has contracted to obtain against a consideration. This will include
chartering-in of vessels, ship manning agreements and sub-contracted services.

2.4.6 Purchaser Supplied Product
This element refers to products, materials information and services supplied by a
second-party (e.g. charterer). On receipt of such item its capability to meet

requirements must be verified. The procedure must also provide a method for
reporting loss, damage or unsuitability of the product to the charterer.

2.4.7 Product Identification and Traceability
Records relating to a particular area of activity (e.g. a particular voyage of a vessel)
must carry a unique identity. Identification must enable the recreation of a voyage
fi-om the voyage records. A method of indexing vessels, voyages, crew, incidents,
hire and freight reconciliation, stores, spares, supplies, routine and planned

maintenance must be established to achieve traceability of each of these aspects.

2.4.8 Process Control
This element has great relevance to ship operations and shipping companies. Activities
ashore and on board identified as essential to the satisfactory and safe operation of the

service offered should be planned in detail. Performance criteria must be established
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for each of these activities. Documented work instructions may be used where the
lack of such instructions may be considered to adversely affect the quality of service.

Manuals, flow charts, decision support systems, standing orders, guidelines and code

of woHdng practices may be used for process control. Documentary evidence of

monitoring and control should be provided by maintaining matrixes, forms, log books
and other appropriate records.

Emergency procedures on board the vessel and ship-shore contingency plans are
special processes whose deficiencies may become apparent only in the event of an
incident. Such procedures and plans must be laid down after carefill evaluation of the

consequences. Detailed documentation of these procedures and plans must be
available. Strict compliance with documented procedure is of paramount importance.

Records oftests of emergency equipment and emergency drills must be maintained.

2.4.9 Inspection and Testing
An inspection and/or verification procedure must be established, in accordance with

the quality plan, for defined items of operation crucial to the quality objectives of the

organisation. This procedure should cover relevant aspects on board and ashore.
Typically, inspection and verification will be required for items critical to charter

parties, management contracts, safety and pollution. The procedure should include

inspection and verification of:
• Cargo quantity and quality
• Cargo handling performance criteria
• Cargo handling and containment system
• Cargo condition maintenance

• Fuel and lubricant quality and quantity
• Vessel planned maintenance system
• Navigation equipment
• Main propulsion equipment
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• Auxiliary machinery and system
• Emergency equipment
• Medical Equipment
• Lifesaving equipment
• Oil spill response equipment
• Alarms and emergency equipment
• Navigation equipment
• Regulatory inspections

Inspection and verification ashore should also include verification of compliance with

contractual requirements, voyage analysis and trend analysis.

2.4.10 Inspection, Measuring and Test Equipment
Instruments utilised in the inspection and verification procedure must be duly
calibrated and used in the prescribed manner. There must be a calibration schedule

and record maintained for these equipment. This principle extends beyond equipment
used to measure length, volume, temperature etc. to navigation instruments, cargo
equipment and loading instrument. The organisation must ensure that measuring and

test equipment used by sub-contractors, if any, is irrspected.

2.4.11 Inspection and Test Status
This element is closely related to the dement regarding product identification and
traceability. In order to preclude the inadvertent acceptance of non-conforming items
the status of inspections and test must be readily apparent to the user. The identity of

the authority who has inspected the item must be easily apparent.

2.4.12 Control of Non-conforming Product
During performance of service, problems will inevitably arise with equipment.
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consumables, personnel and processes. Procedures should be established and
maintained to prescribe actions to take in the event of a problem. The steps for

control

of a non-conformity are identification, documentation , evaluation,

disposition and notification. The intent of the control procedure should be to restore
normalcy as soon as possible and minimise the effect of a non-conformity. There

should be clear definition of the responsibility and authority for dealing with all forms
of non-conformities.

2.4.13 Corrective Action
This element is the corrective feedback in the quality system. It is aimed at eliminating
the root cause of the non-conformity. A thorough analysis of the non-conformity

should be undertaken. All steps of the analysis should be recorded. After the root
cause is determined, corrective action should be planned and executed to eliminate it.

All action should also be documented. Procedures and documents should be updated

to prevent recurrence.

Regulations affecting vessels are amended frequently. The vessel may not comply with
the amended version of

a regulation. Such non-conformities can be promptly

identified by a department within the organisation monitoring the regulatory
environment continuously. This department must evaluate the applicability of new

regulations to the vessels of the fleet.

2.4.14 Handling, Storage, Packaging
This dement does not have any direct relevance to ship operations and slapping
companies.

2.4.15 Quality Records
The organisation should establish and maintain procedures for identifying, storing and
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disposal of quality records. This consists of documents generated by the quality

system as evidence of its functioning and effectivity. These records must be indexed in
such a manner that they are identifiable with particular aspects of service. The period
that records need to be maintained and method of disposal need to be defined.

2.4.16 Internal Quality Audit
There must be a schedule of internal quality audits for various aspects of the service,

to determine effectiveness of the quality system. The importance (quality-related) of
each aspect comprising the service should determine the frequency for its audit. The
results of audits should be documented. These results provide another corrective input

to the quality system. Audit results must be communicated to personnel having

responsibility of the area audited. If internal quality audit reveals a deficiency, prompt
remedial action should be taken.

2.4.17 Training
All shipboard and shore-based personnel need to be provided with training regarding

the quality system. The training must be relevant to their individual roles in the
organisation. All personnel must fulfil qualification and experience requirements

relevant to their responsibilities and authority. In establishing these requirements due
regard should be given to company, national and international regulations and
conventions. Managerial personnel must be trained in the decision making aspects of

the quality system.

2.4.18 Statistical Technique
Any method of checking the quality of service must be based upon a statistically valid

representative sample.
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In essence, quality assurance standards require the establishment of a method to co

ordinate and monitor processes in ship operation and shipping companies.
Implementation of this method is verified by internal and external audits defined by

the standards, fit file shipping industry, a quality system which meets ISO 9002
standards is really a well-defined and codified version of conventional practices of

good management in shipping (on board and ashore). Thus, it can be readily adopted
by the shipping industry. Due to the prescriptive nature of these standards there is a
risk of it being fulfilled in letter but not in spirit, like a myriad of other codes and
regulations covering shipping operations. A process of continuous improvement will

counteract this phenomenon. Continuous improvement will entail the employment of

the more sophisticated tool of ‘total quality management’.

2.5

Total Quality Management (TQM)

Total quality is defined as “the appropriateness of the product or service to its user’s
present and future needs”(Chauvel, 1988, 24). Whereas ISO 9002 is an externally
determined quality system, TQM is based upon the internalisation of quality. Based

upon the principles of continuous improvement, the standards for TQM are
determined by the company itself. Chauvel(1988, 22) clarifies the distinction between

quality assurance and TQM as:
Quality assurance is a technical programme intended to offer a client

prior proof of a firm’s organisational ability to control the quality of
its manufacturing process.
Total quality management is a systemic approach, mobilising all the

firms human resources towards a single objective to carry out
properly, the first time, all tasks culminating in customer satisfaction

and contributing to improvement of the firms financial results

In any organisation which adopts the principles of TQM, the quality assurance system

will exist within the ambience of TQM.
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The individual employee is the key of the TQM effort of an organisation. Each

employee is made accountable for his own performance. This is based on the belief
that an employee is committed to the organisation’s goals and does not need to be

prodded towards them.

The term ‘customer’ also acquires a much wider meaning. A supplier-customer
relationship exists not only between the shipping company and its external customer.

TQM also establishes a supplier-customer quality chain within the organisation. The
output of each employee is focused on fulfilling the quality needs of the customer (the
customer being the next employeeZdepartment in the quality chain).

Total quality management has four integral components which have a symbiotic

relationship with one another. These components are:
• Leadership and commitment

• Organisation
• Total quality culture
• Training

An essential ingredient of the total quality movement in any organisation is leadership.

The company’s top management must have unswerving commitment to the process of
continuous improvement through TQM. The involvement of the boss will fuel the

interest of the employees. If TQM is reduced to sloganeering and sermonising it will.
be perceived by the employees as a gimmick and employee commitment will not be

foftheoming. Top management’s commitment to TQM must have high visibility and it

must be manifested in the actions and policies of the management. Quality goals must
be well-defined and communicated to all the employees.

The seafarer is the cornerstone of total
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quality on board the ship. The seafarer

operates at the interface between the organisation and the external customers. In the
words of Oakland (1989,4), “failure usually finds its way to the interface between the
organisation and the outside customers, and the people who operate as that

interface... usually experience the ramifications”. The seafarer is acutely aware of the

vulnerability of his position at this interface. Senior management should provide the
right signals so that the proverbial cynicism of the seafarer is neutralised and the
tendency to ignore or work around the system is avoided.

The organisational structure must be directed towards the prevention of non

conformity. The overall responsibility of quality should be taken by the chief executive
of the company. The responsibility of quality should lie with the department or

individual that actually does the job. This will necessitate clear job descriptions. TQM
does not require a rigid organisational structure but its success is closely linked with

the ability of the organisational and reporting system to facilitate the flow of
information upward, downward and laterally through the organisation.

The total quality movement must nurture teamwork. Teamwork is the mainstay of

total quality culture. Within every department individuals must be encouraged to

contribute to the team effort. In companies where the ship’s crew is employed on
contract terms through manning agencies, the lack of continuity of ship’s personnel
may prove to be a stumbling block to inculcating total quality culture on board. In

most cases, the loyalty and commitment of such seafarers will be found lacking. This

will, in turn, severely undermine the total quality movement of the organisation as a

whole, if this problem is anticipate^ the issue of loyalty and continuity must be
addressed first.

Training for total quality is a pivotal aspect in the success of TQM in any company.
Ship’s staff and shore personnel must undergo training. The training programme must

have direct relevance to each individual’s area of responsibility. Quality training is
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required for all levels of the organisation, both on board and ashore. The training must

cover systematic training for the prevention of problems, reporting and analysis of
defects or faults, and investigation and correction of circumstances leading to a defect

or fault. Review of the effectiveness of quality training programmes should be
routinely undertaken. The total quality training of a ship’s staff should extend beyond

explanation of the dynamics of the TQM of the organisation, it must include up-dating
training. Up-dating training should include information regarding changes in the

regulatory environment, organisational system and emerging technology. This will aid
the objective of error-free ship operations.

In the fore-going, a conscious effort has been made by the author to avoid invoking
the quality gurus. The principles of TQM as propounded by Deming, Juran, Taguchi

et al. have been successfully applied to the manufacturing industry ashore. Their
theories are relevant to the shipping industry, provided these are pragmatically
adapted to the maritime situation. Millican (1992, 50) warns that:

Total quality management is not a quick fix or a temporary fed, but
neither is it a managerial holy grail. The words of quality gurus
should be carefully heeded, but not read as if they were religious
tracts. The practices, methods and tools which have proved to be

successful when used in manufectuiing should not be ignored but
neither should they be copied without modification in an entirely
different context or in a different culture.

Shipping companies have had no difficulty in applying traditional management

methods in ways which fit their particular circumstances and the workings and culture

of the industry. The same has to be done with the tools and methods of quality
management if they are to become an integral part of the way the company operates

and not just the proverbial flavour of the month.
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3.0

REQUIREMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODE
I am instituting a new order of business which will put safety where

it belongs; in the hands of the owner and operator.

We cannot enter the twenty first century with the attitude of
business as usual.
Attributed to Admiral Kime (USCG)
Det Norske Veritas AS (1995, 5)

3.1

Introduction

The International Code for Safe Operation of Ships and Pollution Prevention

(International Safety Management (ISM) Code), which was adopted by the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) by Resolution 741(18), was given

mandatory effect by the Conference of Contracting Governments for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) on 24 May 1994.

The Conference added three new chapters to SOLAS 74. A new chapter, ‘Chapter IX
- Management for fire Safe Operation of Ships’, sets out definitions relevant to the
ISM Code. It also covers application of the regulations, obligation to establish and

maintmn safety management system, certification, verification and control to be

established by the Flag State.

This amendment will be considered to have been accepted on 1 January 1998, under
the tacit approval system. The amendment shall enter into force on 1 July 1998.
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Passenger ships including passenger high speed craft, oil and chemical tankers, bulk

carriers, gas carriers and cargo high speed crafts of 500 gross tons and over are
required to comply with the provisions of Chapter EX of SOLAS 74 not later than 1

July 1998. Other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units of 500 gross tons and

above are required to comply with these regulations by 1 July 2002.

This was a path-breaking amendment to SOLAS 74. Until then, regulations pertaining

to safety of life and property at sea covered the design and construction of the ship
itselC the equipment

onboard and the qualification and experience of the crew.

SOLAS 74 regulated most of these aspects. For the first time, management of safety

of ships was being covered by SOLAS 74.

Chapter DC makes it mandatory for shipping companies operating defined classes of

ships to have safety management systems. These safety management systems are

subject to certification and review by the Flag State Administration or its appointed
representatives.

SOLAS 74 - Chapter EX defines the identity of an entity called ‘Company’:
“Company” means the owner of the ship or any other organisation

or person such as the manager, or bareboat charterer, who has
assumed responsibility for the operation of the ship fi’om the owner
of the ship and who assuming such responsibility has agreed to take

over all duties and responsibilities imposed by the International
Safety Management Code.

Chapter EX requires the Company to comply with the requirements of the ISM Code.
This is a formal recognition of the shore management’s responsibility for safe

operation of ships and pollution prevention. The Administration or recognised
organisations (including other Governments) will issue a Document of Compliance

(DOC) to every company which complies with the ISM Code. The DOC is a pre-
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requisite for a company to operate ships. A Safety Management Certificate (SMC)
shall be issued by the Administration or recognised organisations to every ship which

operates its shipboard management in accordance with the approved safety
management system. The provisions of Port State Control are applicable to a ship

which is issued a SMC.

The ISM Code has thirteen elements which define the Code. These elements will be

analysed in this chapter under the broad headings of safety culture, checks and
balances, and control measures. The structure of the ISM Code showing the elements

of the ISM and the subjects they cover are summarised below in Table 3.1:

Table-3.1
Elements of the ISM Code

Subject

Name of Element

Preamble
General
Safety and environmental-protection
policy
Company Responsibilities and Authority
Designated person(s)
Master’s responsibility and authority
Resources and personnel
Development of plans for shipboard
operations
Emergency preparedness
Checks and Balances Reports and analysis of non-conformities,
accidents and hazardous occurrences
Maintenance of ship and equipment
Documentation
Company verification, review and
evaluation
Certification verification and control
Control Measures
Safety Culture

Paragraph No.
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0

8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0

13.0

The relationdiip between safety management and quality management is evident fi’om
the structure of the ISM Code. This relationship will help to integrate safety
management into the total management structure of a shipping company and thus
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avoid it being relegated to the status of an appendage. The thirteen elements of the
ISM Code can be easily correlated to most of the eighteen elements of the ISO 9002.

Table 3.2 compares the elements of ISO 9002 with the elements of the ISM Code.

3.2

Safety Culture

Safety is very often described as the control of accidental loss. In shipping operations
such loss includes harm to people, damage to environment, ship, cargo or property.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the cause of around 80% of accidents in ship operations is
attributed to human-related factors. Investigations reveal that about 80% of these
human-related factors have origms rooted in the feilure of the company to cultivate a

safety culture. A good safety culture would

assign high priority to safety (not

withstanding commercial considerations) and encompass all aspects of the company’s

shipping operations. Central to the success of any safety management system is the

establishment of a safety culture in the organisation.

The remarks of Lord Donaldson (1994, 92) succinctly sum up the impact of safety

culture on ship management:
Good ship management depends on a culture of safety, where safety
issues are given high priority in the boardroom as well as in the

ship. This culture will influence the running of the company and its
ships at all levels, including instructions, supervision and training.

In its preamble the Code establishes explicitly that ‘the cornerstone of good safety
management is commitment from the top’. This criteria

also lends itself to

comparison with the tenets of total quality management discussed in Chapter 2.
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Table - 3.2 Comparison of ISO 9002 with the ISM Code
ISO

ISM

Name of Element

9002

Code

Section

Paragraph

4.1

4.2

1.2, 3

Management Responsibility

Quality System

Name of Element

Company & Master’s

5

Responsibilty

1,

Safety System,

11

Documentation

4.4

Document Control

11

Documentation

4.8

Process Control

7,8

Shipboard Operations

Plans, Emergency
Response Plans,
Maintenance
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10,12

Inspection/Testing

Maintenance,
Verification

4.10

Inspection, Measuring and

10

Maintenance

Test Equipment

4.11

Inspection and Test Status

10

Maintenance

4.12

Control of Non-conforming

9

Non-conformities

9,12

Non-conformities,

Product

4.13

Corrective Action

Verification

4.15

Quality Records

11

Documentation

4.16

Internal Quality Audits

12

Company

Verification, Review
& Evaluation

4.17

6,8

Training

Personnel & Training

Sections 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.14, & 4.18 of ISO 9002 have no direct correlation to
the ISM Code.
Modified from International Shipping Review, Spring/Summer 1995
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The ISM Code outlines general principles and objectives which must be adopted by a
company to establish and maintain a safety environment. Although it is prescriptive in
nature it does not prescribe requirements which will constrain legitimate shipping
operations of a company. It does not interfere with the autonomy of the company to

create a company-specific and ship-specific safety management system within the

broad outlines provided by the Code.

3.2.1 General: Safety Management System
The Code requires the company to enunciate its safety management objectives. These
objectives should;

provide for safe practices in ship operations and a safe

working environment;
establish safeguards against all identified risks;

-

continuously

improve safety

management

skills

of

personnel ashore and aboard ships, including preparing for

emergencies

related both to safety and environmental

pollution.

(ISM Code, 1994, 1.2.2)

The company is required to develop a safety management system which should, in
addition to ensuring compliance with mandatory regulations and applicable codes,
also include:

shipboard safety and environment protection procedures;

-

emergency response procedures;
definition of levels of authority, delegation of powers and lines of

communication on board, on shore, and ship-shore;

reporting procedures for accidents and non-conformities;

procedures for internal audit and management review of the system.
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Ross (1994, 226) describes the features of a ‘safety management system’ as

follows;
Modem safety management system must be an integral part of the

total management system for any organisation, integrating intimately
with other management systems if an organisation is to control

losses.
As with all management systems, safety management is essentially a
control system. It has defined parameters which it seeks to maintain

(e.g. policy, rules and objectives), it monitors the process and

detects errors (inspections, tours accident investigation etc.), utilises
feedback and takes suitable corrective action where necessary (e.g.
reviews identifying new or modified training, procedures or
equipment needs). The system itself also has a facility to be

monitored for correct operation by being audited, and suitable

maintenance carried out where necessary, by implementing changes

to the system.

3.2.2 Safety and Environmental-protection Policy
The company must establish, implement and maintain a clear written safety and

environmental-protection policy. Typically, the safety and environment policy,

consistent with the objectives of the ISM Code and the company’s safety management

objectives, should provide a policy direction to the safety management system. To
demonstrate the management’s commitment to safety and environmental-protection it

is preferable that the Chief Executive or top-most representative of the management

sign this document. An example of such a policy document is given in Table 3.3.

3.2.3 Company Responsibilities and Authorities
This element of the Code allows for the operation of the ship by a management

company other than the shipowner.
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Table-3.3

HEALTH SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The management wish all employees to be fully aware of the company policy on I
health, safety and protection of the environment.

The aims of the policy are:

TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF ALL EMPLOYEES AND
OTHER PERSONS. TO CONSERVE THE ENVIRONMENT. TO AVOID
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY.
In all activities account will be taken of the need to:
Aim for the elimination of work-related injuries and illness.
Aim to avoid all pollution and protect the environment.
Aim to comply with both the letter and spirit of all relevant legislation and
International Conventions.

The management;

Believe all injuries on board can be prevented by high standards of safety

consciousness, personal discipline and individual accountability.
Will actively promote employee participation in measures to improve their health and

safety both ashore and on board ship.
Will keep employees fully informed of known or potential hazards that might affect
them.

Will use their best efforts to prevent accidents and minimise harm from accidents that

may happen.
Require the commitment of all employees to safe operating practices and to work
towards the elimination of personal accidents and unhealthy practices.

KNOW YOUR SHIP, KNOW YOUR JOB
THINK SAFE, BE SAFE

Source; Codrington (1991,178)
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Recognising that decisions made ashore can adversely affect the safety and pollution
prevention standards on board, the ISM Code requires that the identify of the entity

ashore who is responsible for the operation of the ship to be formally reported to the

Flag State Administration. This is necessary to establish the identity of the ‘Company’
for the purposes of the Code. The Code requires the Company to state clearly, in

writing, the organisation of personnel for work concerned with safety and pollution

prevention. The Company is obligated by the Code to provide sufficient resources to
enable such personnel to cany out their organisational functions related to safety and

pollution prevention.

3.2.4 Designated Person (s)
A person should be designated by the Company to co-ordinate safety and environment

pollution management. This person will function as a intermediary between ship and
shore management and ensure that necessary resources and shore-based support is

made available to the ship. Typically the designated person will be an appropriately
qualified line manager in the company. In order that the designated person can

conduct objective verification and monitoring of the safety management system, it will

be necessary that the person is independent of the responsibility of implementation of

the system.

The function of the designated person is that of an auditor/custodian of the safety
management system. The designated person must conduct safety audits to detect nonconformities and initiate processes to rectify them. The size of the Company and the
number of vessels operated will determine the number

designated persons required

to make up the Company’s safety audit team. It must be emphasised that if meagre

human resources are made available to the safety audit team, their effort will be
stretched thin and a very vital function in the success of the safety management system

will not be fulfilled.
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3.2.5 Master’s Responsibility and Authority
This element of the Code ensures that responsibility and authority of the master is not
undermined by the safety management system. The Code is explicit in its affirmation

of the discretionary authority of the master to decide on matters concerning safety and
pollution prevention.

The master is traditionally considered the guardian

of safety and environment

protection on board. In order to highlight the supportive role of the safety

management system to the master’s traditional responsibility and authority, the Code
requires that the safety management system should contain a clear statement
emphasising the master’s authority.

The Code also requires the Company to clearly define and document the master’s

responsibility in relation to implementation of safety and environmental-protection

policy as well as motivation of crew, issuance of clear instructions, verification of

specified arrangement and review of the safety management system to detect non

conformities.

3.2.6 Resources and Personnel
This element of the Code focuses upon the human system in ship operations. Allievi
(1991,202) makes the following observation about the human system:

The human system can be seen from a number of different
perspectives. For example, personnel are often seen as passive

victims of casualties and their injuries due to unsafe working
practices, lack of training, inadequate attitudes or commitment to

safety and environmental protection and the mismanagement (by
others) of the technical and/or operational systems. Alternatively,
the human system can be seen to comprise actors who should be

educated and trained to act pro-actively to deal with potentially
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critical situations through their involvement in designing and
controlling the technical and operational systems and containing

losses where the failures occur.

It is the latter aspect of the human system, as described in Allievi’s observation, that is

really being addressed by this element of the ISM Code. This element concentrates
upon two important aspects, personnel and training of ship’s staff.

The Company is responsible for ensuring that the master possesses the requisite
qualifications and experience to command the vessel on which he is posted. The

master should be thoroughly briefed about the company’s safety management system
with particular reference to the vessel that the master is joining. The master must be

given all assistance by the company to enable him to conduct his duties related to
safety and environment protection matters.

The Code requires the Company to ensure that each ship is manned with properly i

qualified, experienced, certificated and medically fit seafarers. In order to ensure the

success of the safety management system the company should provide personnel with
means to familiarise themselves with the duties and procedures related to the safety
management system of a particular ship, before performing such duties.

Wherever it is found necessary, the Company must provide training to personnel in

aspects of the safety management system, understanding of relevant rules, regulations,
codesand guidelines.

intra-ship communication and ship-Company communications form an important part
of the safety management system. In order to enable smooth flow of communication it

will be necessary to recognise a working language for the ship as well as shore. The
Company must ensure that all personnel are adequately conversant with this working
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language. Safety management documentation must be in a language understood by

the personnel concerned.

3.2.7 Development of Plans for Shipboard Operations
On board a ship there are various operations which affect safety and pollution
prevention. Some of these operations may be categorised as ‘special shipboard

operations’. Any error in these operations will become evident only after the

development of a dangerous condition. There are other operations which can be
termed as ‘critical operations’. In critical operations results of an error will be
immediately apparent as a hazardous situation or accident.

This element of the Code requires the Company to develop written procedures and
working practices for the above-mentioned critical operations and special operations.

These procedures should also define responsibility and duty of each person assigned a
task related to such operations.

Tn this element, the Code endeavours to eliminate the ‘grey areas’ which may exist in

the manner in which any critical or special shipboard operation is conducted. These

grey areas exist due to inadequate attention to detail, inept planning and

unsatisfactory communication. In order to assure satisfactory communication the

procedures must pay attention

to efficacy of medium employed and the

comprehensibility of content. Ship’s personnel may encounter difficulties in

understanding a defined procedure if a conscious effort is not made to develop simple
and unambiguous instructions.

The procedures developed by the Company should fulfil the pro-active intent of this
element by stressing upon preventive practices. A step-by-step method for

performing any operation or task in a safe manner would be an ideal method of

laying down procedures. For some operations, due to the very nature of the operation
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itself, it may not be feasible to adopt this step-by-step approach. In such cases the
Company may consider developing operational guidelines to cover the operations.

Due consideration must be given to applicable rules and regulations in all the
operational procedures developed by the Company.

3.2.8 Emergency Preparedness
The plans developed for routine shipboard operation will address the attendant risk in

any operation and reduce it to as low as reasonably practicable levels. These plans will

not totally eliminate the risk of an accident/incident. Contingency planning is intended

to mitigate the effects of this residual risk.
This element of the Code deals with contingency planning. The Company is required
to:
-

establish procedures to identify, describe and respond to potential emergency
shipboard situations;
establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency

actions;

ensure that it can respond at any time to hazards, accidents and emergency

situations involving its ships;

The requirement for emergency plans and instructions, for fire and abandon ship

situations on board, are established by SOLAS III/8, 18, 51, 53. The Code only
expands the scope of this requirement to include other shipboard emergencies. The

ship and shore contingency response

Company’s responsibility to establish

procedures is also explicit in this element of the Code. Under the circumstances, it
may be prudent to have only one contingency plan for each ship-company

combination, encompassing the requirements of SOLAS, MARPOL and the Code. All
likely emergency situations must be catered for by this contingency plan.
The plan should describe the emergency response organisation both on board and
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ashore. It must define the relationship between the ship and shore emergency

organisation.

Identifying potential emergencies is the first step in developing the contingency plan.

This process will have to be undertaken by competent persons with an understanding

of the shipboard and shore systems and an ability to conduct an objective assessment.
AU available sources of information will need to be considered, such as:
national and international rules, regulations and standards;

-

safety guides and codes of working practices;

personal knowledge and experience of ships’ staff and shore personnel;
ofiScial guidelines;

industry guidelines;
accident/incident history within the Company or from other organisations.

When formulating emergency response for any identified contingency the emphasis

should be on defining organisation and broad strategy rather than specific tactics to

counter an emergency. Step-by-step definition of tactics in emergency response will
erode the autonomy of the man-on-the-scene and adversely affect the outcome of the
emergency response. A quick reference checldist, to be utilised by personnel at the

tactical level of the contingency organisation, may be provided in the contingency plan
to facilitate them to make correct tactical decisions.

Efficient communication is vital in any emergency response. The contingency plan
must define communication procedure in an emergency. Where appropriate, standard

procedures and formats must be provided to aid fast and accurate flow of information.

The contingency plan must unambiguously define the circumstances which will require

activation of the contingency plan and the identity of those who have the authority to

do so.
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There must be an established routine for emergency training and drills for all the

emergencies covered in the contingency plan. Shore-based personnel may conduct

only ‘table-top’ drills. Shipboard drills must be as realistic as possible, focusing upon
various emergencies covered in the contingency plan. Integrated drills must be
conducted occasionally to fully test the contingency plan.

3.3

Checks and Balances

A method of checks and balances should be instituted to ensure the effectiveness of

the safety management system.

This will comprise die monitoring

of the safety

management system. The intention of monitoring will be to sustain and improve the

performance of the system.

Strong lines of communication between all levels of the ship’s staff and the shore

management and an established procedure can serve as an able conduit for obtaining
reports about the system. The safety management system must encourage the

utilisation of this conduit. Bellamy (1995, 6) explains the value of these lines of
communication:

What usually happens in organisations, however, is that those at the
front line see things going wrong with the system all the lime but

the management do not. May be they bring things under control by

doing their own quick fix. May be they leave something out that

they see as unnecessary. But perhaps they have overlooked
something. In doing their quick fix or missing something out they

have eroded one of the lines of defence. This brings the possibility

of failure nearer, but no-one can see that. So, it is vitally important

that every one knows what the lines of defence are. Management
should provide systems of communication between themselves and
the front line to make sure that the problems are brought to their
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attention. They should actively seek out information.

Monitoring of the safety management system has two facets, pro-active monitoring

and reactive monitoring. Bromby (1995, 6) includes audits, surveys, tours and
inspections in pro-active monitoring methods and accident/incident investigations as

reactive monitoring methods. Pro-active monitoring verifies the adequacy of and the
degree of compliance with control measures that have been established. It identifies
deficiencies in the system for subsequent remedial action and thus eradicates their

potential causes. Whereas he says that reactive monitoring is the conduct of an

investigation for an accident/incident to;
establish circumstances leading to the event;

identify whether existing controls were adequate;
provide data to identify a trend, which could indicate the requirement for
further training and modified procedure.

3.3.1 Reports and Analysis of Non-conformities, Accidents

and

Hazardous Occurrences
The Code requires that the safety management system provides methods to report

non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations to the Company. The Company
is required to investigate and analyse such reports in order to implement corrective

action.

Any deviation from procedures and instructions prescribed by the safety management
system can be considered a non-conformity. The requirement to report non
conformities can very easily degenerate into a banal paper exercise between the

master and the shore management. The potential of a non-conformity report to
provide substantial corrective inputs to the safety management system can be fully

utilised by instituting a reporting system which permits the reports to originate from
any person on board. Every member of the ship’s staff must be encouraged to file
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non-conformity reports. Blank forms for non-conformity reports must be available to
all personnel on board. The master should act as a facilitator in this reporting process.

All reports should be sent through the designated person ashore to the concerned
departments of the Company. The department can determine corrective action and

ensure recurrence is avoided.

Very often, circumstances may arise where it may

become necessary to modify procedures and instructions in the safety management

system in the light of the a non-conformity report received.

The master should report accidents and hazardous situations (near accidents) to the

designated person ashore. Such reports must provide details of likely causes and loss
to persons, property and environment. The Company is required to conduct an

investigation and analysis of the incident on the basis of these reports. The
investigation and analysis will provide the management relevant feedback on the
safety management system provided it is conducted as a fact-finding and not fault

finding exercise. Sagen (1993,4) says:

What is often forgotten , is that even if several of the accident
reporting seems to be of limited importance, any accident or near
accident has a potential for serious loss and points out deficiencies

in the management system. The difference between limited

consequences and a serious loss is often a matter of inches, seconds
or chance.
Furthermore, any safety program is warning about the possible confusion

between the symptoms of a problem and the root cause. The symptoms may be ■
repeated over and over again, but identification of the root cause should trigger
management action needed to eliminate or cure the reason for the accident.

3.3.2 Maintenance of Ship and Equipment
A substantial number of maritime accidents are claimed to be caused by technical
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failures. The term ‘technical failure’ is very often used as a euphemism for more
revealing causes such as poor maintenance, dilution of standards and failure to comply

with applicable rules and regulations.

This element of the Code requires the Company to ‘establish procedures to ensure
that the ship is maintained in conformity with provisions of relevant rules and

regulations and with any additional requirements that may be established by the
Company’. (ISM Code, 10.1)

Routine inspections, non-conformity reports,

appropriate remedy of defects and maintenance of records are the measures

prescribed by the Code to fulfil the requirements of this element.

In essence, the Code recommends a planned maintenance system for ship and

equipment with particular emphasis on items critical to safety and pollution
prevention. Planned maintenance is the converse of breakdown maintenance. The

objective of planned maintenance is to ensure that routine maintenance work on ship
and equipment is undertaken so as to pre-empt failure. The objective of planned

maintenance is thus congruent with the pro-active objectives of the safety
management system.

In addition to inspection by the ship’s personnel during routine maintenance of the

ship and equipment, the Company should develop a routine for inspection of ship and
equipment by appropriately qualified shore-based personnel. A well structured

questionnaire which asks objective ship-specific questions about specific items of
equipment and ship condition is the best method of making the inspection intensive

and effective. The safety management system documentation must provide details

about such inspections. A record of routine inspection by ship and shore personnel
must be maintained in a manner prescribed by the safety management system.
Deficiencies observed during inspection should be reported to the Company for
prompt corrective action.
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3.3.3 Documentation
In various elements, the Code prescribes written documentation for various aspects of

the safety management system. In order to prevent invalid, unauthorised and outdated
documents from continuing to exist within the safety management system, the Code
prescribes that the "Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all

document and data which are relevant to the safety management system’. (ISM Code,
II)

A system of indexing and numbering the documents should be established which will
facilitate the monitoring of every document which is part of the system. Document
validity must be checked by a person ashore for those documents which form a part of

the shore management segment. The master must undertake this responsibility on

board. The Designated Person ashore is in an ideal position to oversee document

control. AU changes to documents must be duly authorised by the designated person.
The indexing and numbering system for the documentation will simplify document

tracing and updating.

3.3.4 Company Verification, Review and Evaluation
hl order to verify continued compliance with the procedures established by the safety
management system, the Code requires the Company to conduct internal safety audits,
periodical reviews and evaluation of safety management system in accordance with a

documented procedure. Audit personnel must be preferably independent of the area
audited. Audit results should be conveyed to personnel responsible for the area
audited both on board and ashore. Shore management must ensure prompt correction

of deficiencies.

To enable the internal audit team to understand audit methodology they must be

adequately trained to conduct their duties. The audit team may use a combination of
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witnessing the activity and cross-checking records to establish that the activities are in

accordance with defined procedures. The frequency of the internal audit will depend

on the nature of the area being audited and its criticality to safety and pollution

prevention.
•
A determinant of the effectivity of an audit programme is the promptness of remedial

action. The safety management system must establish a procedure whereby any non
conformities or deficiencies reported by the audit personnel, if unattended by the line

manager in a specified time will automatically attract the attention of a higher level of
management.

The overall health of the safety management system must be ensured by conducting a

recorded management review of the system periodically. This review should consider:
audit findings;

analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous occurrences;
compliance with rules and regulations;

effectiveness of the safety management system;
modifications to the system.

3.4

Control Measures

Regulation IX-4 and Regulation IX-6 of SOLAS 74 provides administrations with the

authority to monitor the safety management system of a Company and its ships. Flag

State and Port State control which were applicable to various aspects of a vessels
equipment, construction and manning requirements have been extended to include the
safety management system.

At its third meeting in London from 20-24 February 1995 the Flag State
Implementation (FSI) Sub-committee of the IMO adopted ‘Guidelines on the
Implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations’ (IMO Guidelines). This
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document provides guidance to the Aministration on certification, verification and

control measures relevant to the Code.

3.4.1 Certification Verification and Control
This element of the Code re-affirms the requirements laid down by SOLAS Chapter

DC.

The IMO Guidelines lay down normal duration of validity of a DOC and SMC as five

years. The DOC will be subject to annual verification and the SMC will be subject to
at least one intermediate verification.

Administrations should not develop criteria in the form of prescriptive management
system solutions because this may alienate the management system from the Company

and the ship. This would defeat the very purpose of the Code and reduce it to a paper

exercise lacking in substance. ISM Code is meant to improve safety and pollution
prevention standards by a process of internalisation of its objectives. Internalisation
cannot be achieved by implementing prescriptive solutions prepared by other

organisations or statutory bodies. A progressive administration must play the role of a
catalyst in the safety management process.
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DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF

4.0

SAFETY MANAGEMENT ON TANKERS
Safety, like health or happiness, tends to be measured more by its
absence than its presence.
J.T.Reason
\

The Management of Safety in Shipping
(1991,75)

4.1

'

Introduction

Over the years the tanker has developed into a safe and environmentally-friendly
means of transport due to improved design, maintenance and operational practices.

However, there can be no such ship as an accident-proof tanker. A well-designed

safety management system can help to eliminate catastrophic incidents and greatly

reduce the probability of minor accidents on tankers. This chapter will look at various
aspects of development and implementation of safety management on tankers.

A safety management system comprises the following functions:

-

definition «z

analysis y
control
monitoring

review ✓
The definition and analysis function is carried out by safety assessment. Hie control

function

has two clear parts. The first part deals with the development of

management controls and the second deals with the implementation of controls.
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SAFETY & ENV.
PQTTCV____
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INTERNATIONA!
REGULATIONS

Development of
MANAGEMENT

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

New Hazards Identified

implementation

-♦

monitoring

OF CONTROLS

REVIEW OF THE
SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Identify Changes Required

Fig. 4.1 - An Overview of a Safety Management System
Source: Modified from AEA Technology,s
“Ideal Safety Management System”

Inputs for the development of management controls come from the fleet safety
and environment policy, national and international regulations, and results of safety

assessment. The monitoring function consists of two components. The first
component, audit and inspection, is pro-active while the second component,

accident/incident reporting, is reactive. The review function provides feedback to the

system by identifying any changes required in the system (refer Fig. 4.1)

4.2

Safety Assessment

Safety assessment is a methodical process of identifying and analysing the hazards

linked with an activity or operation and establishing the level of risk. This process

helps to evaluate the Company’s performance in terms of safety, pollution prevention
and overall efficiency in order to develop and implement controls which provide a less

hazardous means of achieving the aims of the organisation.

Risk is the probability of a hazard occurring in a specified period or under specified

circumstances. In this context, a hazard is an undesired physical event which is
capable of harm and/or damage to

persons, property and/or environment. The

principal steps of safety assessment are:

identification of hazards
analysis of the cause of hazards
evaluation of risk

The process of safety assessment should

be undertaken without any foregone

conclusions and pre-conceived bias. Objectivity is the keyword. The effort shouhl be

to establish how safety is actually being managed rather than how it is believed to be

managed. The outcome of the exercise is to develop better methods for carrying out
the tasks in a less hazardous manner.
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Hazard identification will provide the basis for fulfilment of the requirement of

paragraph 1.2.2.2 of the ISM Code which requires the Company to ‘establish

safeguards against all identified risks’. Ross (1994, 226) classifies methods of hazard
identification as follows:
Hazard identification techniques generally fall into two categories:

comparative and fundamental methods. The comparative method

would simply consider all previous hazards encountered on similar
ships or ship systems, and consider if these hazards were present on
the proposed ship or systems. A more thorou^ technique is a

fundamental method known as Hazard and Operability studies
(HAZOPs). The intent here is to examine systematically all project
activities and processes through the use of keywords or a

combination of guide-words and parameters using

a multi

disciplinary approach.

HAZOPs will examine processes and activities both on board and in the shore

management in order to identify likely hazards and operational problems. Thorough

hazard identification will require a complete understanding of the process or activity

being examined. The study will be most effective when conducted by a multi
disciplinary team. The team should consist of experienced ship’s staffs ship
superintendents, fleet safety officer, trainers, commercial manager, fleet personnel
manager, purchase and services manager. The team must have a chairman who is
fanuhar with HAZOPs methodology and a secretary to record discussions and

findings. Members df the team must have a thorough knowledge of their area of

specialisation and its relevance to the safety management system. The HAZOPs team
should focus upon various activities in tanker operations in a systematic fashion and
identify all hazardous malfunctions and faulty processes. Relevant publications and

sources of information need to be referred to, such as:

national legislation, codes and guidance of a ship’s flag state and port state;
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international conventions, recommendations and codes;

product information;
expert advice and opinion;

record of previous accidents and incidents within the organisation and other
organisations.

personal knowledge and experience of managers and employees;

industry or trade association guidelines' (e.g. IMO, ICS, ISF, OCIMF, CEFIC,
SIGTTO) such as:
• International Safety Guide for Oil Tanker and Terminals
• Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals)
• Tanker Safety Guide (Liquefied Gas)

• Ship to Ship Transfer Guide (Petroleum)
• Ship to Ship Transfer Guide (Liquefied Gas)

• Bridge Procedures Guide
• Perils at Sea and Salvage - A Guide for Masters
• Anchoring Systems and Procedures for Large Tankers

• Piratesand Armed Robbers-A Master’s Guide
• Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations
• Medical First Aid Guide for use in Accidents Involving Dangerous

Goods
• Emergency Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous Goods
• Guidelines for the Development of Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency •

Plans
• Prevention of Oil Spillage through Cargo Pumproom Sea Valves
• Manual on Chemical Pollution
• Manual on Oil Pollution

• Cargo Firefighting on Liquefied Gas Carriers
• Clean Seas Guide for Oil Tankers
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• Effective Mooring
• De Verwey’s Tank Cleaning Guide
• Guide to Contingency Planning for the Gas Carrier Alongside and

Within Port Limits
• Contingency Planning and Crew Response Guide for Gas Carrier

Damage at Sea and in Port Approaches

On board tankers the hazards that need to be considered will include fire, explosion,
collision, stranding or grounding, personnel injury, pollution, pirate attack and

uncontrolled release of hazardous cargo. Further, tankers carrying highly reactive
cargoes should also consider hazards arising out of inadvertent mixing of incompatible

cargo, reaction of cargo with air, water and other materials.

Shipboard procedures with a potential of creating the identified hazards must be
closely examined during analysis of the cause of hazards. The procedures examined
should include procedures for bridge, engine room, life-saving, fire-fighting, pollution
prevention, cargo handling, permits to work, anchoring and mooting, ship security,

emergency and maintenance.

A«igg«ing even, usueny pn^vides .he inida. «ne in a sys.em which .hen proceeds

through a sequence of events until it culminates in a hazardous outcome. Cause

analysis traces the event chain in every operation or activity to establish the link

between events and hazardous outcome. Two methods can be used to study the
sequence of events, namely, event-tree analysis and fault-tree analysis.

In the event-tree analysis method it is necessary to flowchart every relevant process or

activity. The point of commencement of the analysis is a feilure in the process. The
intention of this exercise is to establish how a triggering event could lead to a
specified hazardous outcome (e.g. pumproom explosion). The probable event
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sequences, after a failure in a system, are traced to find which combination of events
will precipitate a hazardous situation. If a branch of the trace leads to a non-hazardous

outcome it is not traced any further. The limitation of this method is that the same

outcome could also arise from other causes which would not be apparent from a
single trace. The advantage of this method is that a whole range of outcomes can be
analysed from the same tree. This may be termed as a ‘bottom-up method’.

The fault-tree analysis method starts with the hazard and traces backwards to identify

the faults which lead to the hazard. This means the ‘effect’ is identified first and the
‘cause’ is traced. This method is less complex as only those faults which directly

contribute to the hazardous outcome need to be traced. Each hazardous outcome can
be represented by a separate fault-tree in which many events interact to produce other
events by a simple logical relationship (AND, OR etc.). Separate outcomes will

require separate trees. The fault-tree analysis method may be termed as a ‘top-down’

technique and is often the preferred method.

On conclusion of cause analysis a description of the hazard development process is
obtained and receptors are identified. Receptors are persons, environment, ship/shore

systems and property affected by the hazardous event.

Once the hazards are identified and their cause analysed, it is necessary to evaluate the
risk by estimating the probability of occurrence and assessing the consequence of the

hazard The probability and consequence of a hazard can be evaluated by its effect-

upon receptors. A qualitative evaluation can be undertaken.

In a qualitative evaluation a judgmental ranking of the hazard, from past e7q)erience, is
expressed on a qualitative scale for the likelihood and consequences of the hazard. A

qualitative scale and method of evaluation was proposed in a submission (MSC
65/24/2) by tJse United Kingdom, at the 65th session of the Maritime Safety
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Committee in May 1995. An example of the scale is given in Table 4.1. This scale

can be utilised to rank

the consequence and

probability

of each identified

hazard scenario. These rankings can then be used to locate each hazard scenario in

the risk matrix provided at the bottom of Table 4.1. High risk hazards will be located
in the top right-hand comer of the matrix. The matrix will make it simpler to identify

unacceptable risk levels and develop controls to reduce the risk to acceptable level.
When developing controls the following criteria can be used:
-

control measures for risks which could create catastrophic consequences, even
if they are infrequent, should be given greater priority than risks which create

only small losses;

where two risks have the same consequence the control measure should
address the one with the higher likelihood first.

4.3

Developing Controls

It can be seen from Fig. 4.1 that the safety and environment policy, national and
international regulations, and results of safety assessment need to be considered when

developing controls. This process consist of the following components:

design

documentation
training

4.3.1 Design of Controls
Those risks which are hardware-related will need design measures to reduce them to

acceptable levels. Where engineering design changes are not practicable, procedural
measures may need to be considered. It is essential to ensure, that developed measures
are simple and user-friendly.
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RANKING SCALES
LIKELIHOOD

1

2

Scale

Definition

‘extremely

Not expected to occur in the lifetime of the

improbable’

installation

‘improbable’

Isolated incidents of this type have been
known and could be expected to occur in the

installation’s lifetime
3

‘probable’

Would escpect an occurrence within a 10 year

timeframe
4

‘frequent’

Would expect several occurrences within a 10

year time frame

CONSEQUENCES
1

‘Minor’

Only minor injuries expected

2

‘Major’

Major injury to operator predicted

3

‘Severe’

Single Fatality

4

‘Catastrophic’

Multiple Fatalities

RISK MATRIX
unacceptable

4

FREQUENCY

3
2

CATEGORIES

1

acceptable

1

2

3

4

CONSEQUENCE CATEGCIRIES

TABLE 4.1
Source: IMO-Maritime Safety Committee document MSC 65/24/2

59

Company Management Documentation
(Main Company Manual)
Objectives and Description of the Company's SMS
including Top Management Deacons affecting
Professional Line Managers and Employees

Office
Management
Documentation

Contingency
Plan

Tasks
Description
instructions
Procedures
Audit schedule
etc.

(Shore-based)

Shipboard Manage ment Documentation
(Shipbos rd Manual)
Description of Shipbortrd Management System
including direction 3 for Ship Operations
Maintenance, Administrai ion and Audit Requirements
Solas

Safety

Cargo

Shiptxwd

Training

Manual

Handling

Contingency

Manual

Plan

Manual

Source: (Guidelines on the application of the IMO International Safety Management
Code (1994, 32)

Fig. 4.2

4.3.2 Documentation
The backbone of the safety management system is the safety management
documentation. All activities which have any relationship with safety and pollution

prevention must be identified and documented. The Company is required to provide

procedures in the safety management system documentation for:
• Shipboard operations (ISM Code 7.0)
• Emergency preparedness (ISM Code 8.0)
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• Non-conformity, accident, hazardous occurrence reports (ISM Code 9.0)

• Ship maintenance (ISM Code 10.0)
• Maintenance of documentation (ISM Code 11.0)
A proposed structure of documentation fulfilling the requirements of the Code is

shown in Fig. 4.2, above.

Ute Main Company Manual may consist of several large loose-leaf folders. Each
section may be contained in separate folders. A loose-leaf structure for most of the

reference documentation will make it easy for updating documents when corrections
are required to be done

The Main Company Manual is the master document of the Company’s safety

management system. Table 4.2 provides an example of the list of contents of the Main
Company Manual.

The safety management system should be consistent with the safety and environment

policy. In order to indicate the primacy of the safety and environment policy the first
section of the Main Company Manual should be dedicated to it. This will typically be

followed by a section which will briefly describe the company’s business with regard
to trade, fleet information and formal strategy for implementing the safety and

environment policy.

The organisational structure of the Company and the departmental relationships must

be laid down in writing. This section must define individual responsibilities, reporting

lines and inter-relations (ship, shipZshore, authorities, other relevant organisations).
There must be an overall job description for all personnel associated with the safety

management system. If it is found necessary a more detailed description may be

separately provided in the task description in the oflBce management documentation.
This section should also provide written procedures regarding the delegation of
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MAIN COMPANY MANUAL
List of Contents
1.0

Safety and Environment Policy

2.0

Trade and Fleet Information -

3.0

Organisation

4.0

Safety Management

5.0

Personnel Safety

6.0

Environmental Pollution Prevention

7.0

Safe Shipboard Operations

8.0

Personnel and training /

9.0

Rules, Regulations, Laws and Codes y

10.0

Administration

11.0

Documentation'^

12.0

Auditing & Review-

13.0

Contingency plan J

y

r

Table 4.2
Modified from; Training Course Documentation of International Safety and Quality

Management System Development & Implementation Course, Piraeus, January 1995. DNV

responsibilities in case of absence of senior decision-makers. Designated Persons who
are entrusted with the responsibility and authority, by the Company, to perform
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inspections and verification must be formally identified in this part of the Main

Company Manual. The duties and responsibilities of the Designated Person are

defined in this section. Written safeguards to preserve the independence of the
Designated Person are provided in this section. In this manner the regulatory

requirement under paragraph 3.2 and 4.0 of the Code will be fulfilled.

The section dedicated to the description of the safety management system should
provide an overview of the documentation, both shore and shipboard, through a block
diagram or equivalent means, so as to enable hierarchical structure of the manuals and

documents to be understood by the users. The documentary procedure and frequency

for periodic reviews and evaluation of the safety management system will be
delineated in this section. The principle and methods of accident/near accident/nonconformity reporting (ISM Code 9.0), and management review/verification (ISM

Code 12.0) should be outlined here.

The Main Company Manual should dedicate a section to Personnel Safety. Matters

regarding occupational health and safety of employees should be covered in this
section. Procedures to inform shipboard personnel regarding health hazard of oil,
chemical and liquefied gas cargoes must be clearly defined. Where a health

maintenance programme for shipboard personnel is instituted, this section must

contain details about it. On board tankers regulatory requirements and safe working

practices prescribe the use of various additional safety and personnel protection. This
section may re-state and amplify the requirements and lay down company-specific safe

working standards, higher than the regulatory standards.

The section on environmental pollution prevention in the Main Company Manual
should reiterate the Company’s pollution policy and outline the procedures, both
shipboard and on shore, for the prevention of pollution. Tankers will already have in

place an approved shipboard oil pollution emergency plan (SOPEP) in compliance
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with Regulation 26 of Marpol Annex I. Efforts should be made to make the
Company’s environmental pollution prevention measures consistent with the SOPEP

so that major changes do not have to be undertaken in the pollution prevention plans
on board.

In order to fulfil the requirement of paragraph 7.0 of the ISM Code the Company
must formally identify shipboard operations where safety and pollution prevention are
important. This is achieved in the section on safe shipboard operations. A similar

section is provided in the Shipboard Manual, which will be discussed in detail later in
this chapter. The safeguards in the system, to ensure that procedures are being

followed, are to be detailed in this section.

The section on personnel and training in the Main Company Manual should provide

the details which will enable the Company to fulfil the requirements of paragraph 6.0

of the ISM Code. The procedure for selection and recruitment of ship’s personnel,
with particular reference to manning requirements, qualification and medical fitness,

should be contained in this section. The method of briefing senior officers, so as to
ensure that they are fully conversant with the safety management system before

joining, must be laid down. Procedures for familiarising new personnel and personnel

transferred to new assignments related to safety and pollution prevention must be
defined. This section may also include the drug and alcohol polity of the Company

and a description of the measures for implementing the same on board. The training

requirement for shipboard and shore personnel must be clearly stated in this section.

Rules, regulations^ laws and codes are continually changing. The safety management

system has to function in this regulatory environment and ensure continued
compliance. The Main Company Manual should have a section dedicated to this

subject. This section will describe procedures to ensure that the relevant persons on

board and ashore are kept informed about the content of rules, regulations, laws and
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codes. This can be achieved by formally designating an individual/department in the
shore management to undertake the co-ordination and supply of all relevant rules,

regulations, laws and codes and updating the same. In this manner the safety library

on board and ashore will be provided with up-to-date information.

Administrative procedures need to be laid down to ensure safe ship operation. In the
absence of a safety management system many companies use circulars and fleet orders

to communicate these procedures to the ships of their fleet. In the section on
administration such information should be systematically collated. Areas which may

be covered should include safety, maintenance, spares and stores, docking and repairs,

communication, data systems and filing systems.

The section on documentation in the Main Company Manual should establish

procedures for proper identification , distribution, collection and maintenance of
safety management system documents, drawings, manuals, instructions and other
publications. Standardised formats of frequently used forms, with instruction on their

use, should be provided. Procedures to incorporate changes in documents must be
described in this section.

The Main Company Manual must contain a section on auditing and review. This

section should contain the documented procedure for conducting internal audit and

review of the safety management system. Procedure for reporting audit findings and

escalating the findings to higher management if not responded to within a specified
time frame, should be provided. A list of the specific areas to be audited should be

given. The qualification of audit personnel must be clearly laid down.

The section on contingency plan in the Main Company Manual should provide a
broad description of the procedure to be adopted in case of a ship emergency

situation which threatens to endanger personnel, ship or environment. It should
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describe the emergency organisation in the Company’s office ashore and also on
board.

The inter-relationship between the shore-based contingency plan and the

shipboard contingency plan should be explained in this section. Details of responses

for various emergencies such as search and rescue, man overboard, missing crew,
injuryfillness/fatality, collision, stranding, hull damage, fire/explosion, pollution, pirate

attack etc. should be described separately in the shore-based contingency plan and
shipboard contingency plan.

The office management documentation should consist of a

Safety Management

Office Manual with different sections dedicated to each shore-based activity or
department whose actions affect safety and pollution prevention on board. Detailed

description regarding procedures, job descriptions and instructions to be followed by
each department should be provided in this manual. Only the areas which are critical

to shipboard safety and pollution prevention need be covered by the procedures and
instructions. Typically, the personnel, operations, insurance, purchase and technical
departments of the shipping company will be involved in these critical areas. In order

to avoid ambiguity it is desirable that the procedures and instructions should clearly

indicate the criteria to be fulfilled. The prime objective of this document should be to
prevent the occurrence of accidents/incidents by adhering

to defined procedures

which give due consideration to safety and pollution prevention. In addition, response
and follow-up procedures for accident/incident reports must be laid down. In order to
ensure that all documented procedure is practicable, it is preferable that each section

of this manual is authored by the respective departments and signed by the head of
department.

In order to ensure consistency with the Company’s safety and

environment policy and the Main Company Manual it may be edited by the

department assigned the charge of co-ordinating the safety management system.

The shore-based contingency plan and the shipboard contingency plan must work

in conjunction with each other. Ideally, they should be two parts of a common plan.
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The term Emergency Response Plan (ERP) will be used to describe the common
plan which covers both shipboard and shore-based emergency response. In an

emergency situation, the ERP should provide guidance for both the shipboard and

shore personnel. Table 4.3 provides a suggested list of contents for the ERP.

The introduction to the ERP should explain its purpose and scope. The primary

purpose of the ERP will be to help maintain control in the event of a contingency by

pre-planning, delegating and rehearsing essential tasks so that more time is available

for making important strategic decisions. The ERP is intended to optimise the
emergency response time and to ensure maximum shipboard and shore preparedness.
The scope of the ERP must be established by defining the situation and type

of emergencies which are intended to be covered by it. The geographical areas that
the plan will cover must also be stated in this section.

Internal and external communication are an essential aspect of emergency response.
The section on general instructions in the ERP, should provide guidance on:
activation of the emergency plan;

on board communication;
maintaining ship-shore contact;

situation reports.
The language to be used in all emergency communication should be explicitly stated in

this section. A method of record-keeping must be clearly detailed in this section.
Instructions on managing the media should be provided. Formats and guidelines for

making mandatory and voluntary reports to other agencies must be given in this

section. A system of notification of next-of-kin of casualties and guidance on dealing
with next-of kin enquiries must be provided in this section.

The section on emergency organisation in the ERP must provide a clear description of
the overall emergency response structure.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
List of Contents

1.0

Introduction

- Purpose & Scope of ERP

2.0

General Instructions

- Emergency Communications
Language
Record keeping
Reporting
Managing media/outside agencies

3.0

Emergency Organisation - Shore
Ship

4.0

Emei^ency Response

5.0

Training and DriUs

6.0

Ship-specific plans, muster lists, infonnation and other details

7.0

Contact Lists

8.0

Record of Revisions and Distribution

- Structural feilure
Main Engine failure
Steering Gear failure
Electrical Power failure
Collision
Grounding/Stranding
PoUution/Threatened Pollution
FireZ&cplosion
Flooding
Cargo jettisoning
Man overboard
Emergency entry into enclosed space
Serious injury
Terrorism or piracy
Helicopter rescue/evacuation operation
Heavy weather damage
Abandon ship

Table 4.3
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The following additional details, related to shore-based response, must be provided in

this section:
emergency response organisation ashore;

outline of the shipboard emergency response organisation;
location of shore-based emergency headquarters;
method of mobilising shore-based emergency responders;

duties of shore personnel who are allotted a role in the ERP.

procedure for post-emergency assessment on board.
Ship-specific details should be provided in the ship’s copy of the ERP covering:

emergency response organisation on board;

duties of ship’s personnel in the shipboard emergency organisation;
procedure for post-emergency assessment on board.

The section on emergency response in the ERP should detail emergency response

procedures for shipboard and shore personnel, in various specified emergencies. A
system of flow charts and checklists may be used to achieve this. When developing

this section on ERP, existing emergency response procedures must be evaluated to

establish whether they are suitable for incorporating into the ERP. It is preferable to

adopt a proven existing procedure.

The section on training and drills in the ERP should define the training needs for
emergency responders, both on board and ashore. This section will also specify the

frequency and type of drills to be carried out. Various international, flag state and port
state regulations specify requirements for drills. These requirements are to be
considered when developing this section.

The section in the ERP which provides ship specific drawings and information will

have to be laid out differently for the shore plan and the shipboard plan. In the case of

the shipboard plan a copy of the muster list, general arrangement plan, fire control
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plan,

lifesaving equipment plan and

stability infonnation should be provided. In

addition this section should contain an up-to-date list of plans, drawings and manual
available on board with their location. Whereas, in the case of the shore-based plan it
will not be practicable to include plans of all the vessels in the fleet, thus this section
should contain an up-to-date list of plans, drawings and manuals for each vessel. This

list must also state where these plans, drawings and manuals are located. It is
advisable to keep the general arrangement plan, fire control plan,

lifesaving

equipment plan and stability information for each vessel in a location close to the
shore-based emergency headquarters;
The ERP should contain a section which will, provide contact lists for the emergency

responders. It should contain contact lists for:
Company contacts
Ship Interest contacts

Coastal State contacts
Port contacts.

The final section of the ERP should contain a record of revisions and a distribution
list. This will ensure that:

All copies of plan documents are maintained up-to date

Copies of new documents, or revisions to existing

documents are distributed correctly
Information passes through a validation and approval system

before being included in the plan

Records of production, issue, distribution, revision and
withdrawal of copies of plan document are maintained

The format, presentation style and appearance of plan
documents are regulated

(MacGregor, 1994,14)
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The Main Shipboard Manual is the primary shipboard safety management

document.It is a ship-specific master document within the overall safety management

system. This manual should provide the policies and directions for the safety
management system on board. All personnel on board and ashore who have key

functions in the safety management system must be familiar with the contents of this

manual.

It is likely that this manual will consist of several volumes. In order to

facilitate updating it is preferable that this manual is prepared in a loose-leaf format.

Table 4.4 provides an example of the list of contents of a typical Main Shipboard
Manual.

MAIN SHIPBOARD MANUAL
last of Contents

1.0

Safety and Environment Policy

2.0

Organisation

3.0

Safety Management

4.0

Personnel

5.0

Shipboard Operations

6.0

Inspection and Maintenance of Safety Devices and
Equipment

7.0

Rules, Regulations, Laws and Codes

8.0

Non-conformities, Breakdowns and Accidents

9.0

Document Control

Table 4.4
The introduction to the Main Shipboard Manual should specify the validity of the
manual. A format should be provided to record revisions, corrections and updating of
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the manual. A distribution list should indicate all the locations at which a copy of this

manual is available.

The first section of the Main Shipboard Manual should

contain the safety and

environment policy of the Company. It must be remembered that this manual is
primarily meant for use by ship’s personnel. In order to remove any ambiguities which
may arise due to the general nature of the policy statement, this section must also
enunciate

shipboard priorities to ensure successful implementation of this policy.

This section must explicitly re-affirm the master’s overriding authority in matters
concerning safety and pollution prevention.

The section dedicated to organisation should provide a description of the overall

safety organisation of the Company.. This section should provide a shipboard
organisation chart indicating departments, personnel and line of reporting. It must also

contain a list of duties and detailed job description of all personnel on board, in
matters related to safety and pollution prevention.

The interrelationships,

r

responsibilities and authority between the ship and departments in the shore
management must be described in this section of the manual. The role and identity of

the Designated Person(s) must be explained in this section.

In the section on safety management, details on frequency, method and recording of

the master’s verification and review of the shipboard safety management system
should be provided. Verification should be an on-going recorded process, undertaken

by file master almost on a daily basis, to ensure that prescribed operational procedures
and master’s standing orders are being complied with. The Master’s review should be

a documented periodical evaluation, at intervals of less than one year, of the overall

efficacy of the safety management system. Norms for shipboard safety committee
meetings and records to be maintained will be described in this section.
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The section on personnel in the Main Shipboard Manual must detail the normal
manning scale for the vessel. This section must also state the minimum manning scale

for the vessel and define the level of competency and fitness for each person on board.

Procedure for handing/ taking over command of the vessel, including details of
specific matters to be checked at such times must be clearly described in this section.
Details of prescribed familiarisation procedure when change of personnel occurs, must

be provided in this section. This section should contain the fleet drug and alcohol
policy.

Random testing procedure for substance abuse must be detailed in this

section.

This section should contain a record of external training undergone by

shipboard personnel.

The results of the safety assessment procedure, undertaken at the beginning of the
process for developing the safety management system, will be very usefill for

developing

procedures, instructions, checklists for special and critical shipboard

operations. These procedures, instructions and checklists must be included in the
section on shipboard operations in the Main Shipboard Manual. The procedures

should incorporate international and national legislation and relevant industry
guidelines. For each operation, the duties of personnel involved must be clearly
defined. Checklists should be provided for key operations. Written procedures must at

least cover the following operational practices;
•

Bridge Procedures

Master’s standing instructions

Familiarisation with bridge equipment
Correction of charts and publications

Use of radar and other navigational aidsAnstruments

Monitoring and recording compass and other instrument errors

-

Passage planning
Preparing for sea/arrival in port

Daily/periodic tests and checks
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Changing over watch, fitness for duty

Watchkeeping at sea
Navigation in heavy weather

Navigation in coastal waters and traflBc separation schemes
Navigation in restricted visibility
Navigation with pilot embarked
Watchkeeping at anchor

Embarkation/disembarkation of pilot
Engine-room Procedures

Chief Engineer’s standing instructions
Familiarisation with engine-room equipment

Daily/periodic tests and checks
Monitoring and recording of machinery and equipment
performance

Bunkering

Preparing for sea/ arrival in port
Routines in confined waters and under pilotage

Watchkeeping at sea
Cleanliness of engine-room

List, location of manufacturer’s manuals
Other Operational Procedure
Safe work-wear and personnel protection

Permit to work. Enclosed space entry

Pollution prevention

Gangway procedure
Safe working practice
Cargo Procedures

As cargo operations on tankers are likely to be complex a separate
cargo handling manual should be provided.
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The section on inspection and maintenance of safety devices and equipment should

detail the planned maintenance system for safety equipment, communication
equipment, load line equipment, pollution prevention equipment. The planned

maintenance system

should also cover critical

devices/equipment

such

as

temperature/pressure/level alarms in the cargo handling system, emergency shut down
systems, fixed and portable gas detection system, crude oil washing system (where

applicable) and inert gas system. This section must detail how inspections and tests
must be carried and the procedure for making and following-up repair specifications.

The ship should be provided with copies of relevant rules, regulations^ laws and
codes. The section on rules, regulations, laws and codes in the Main Shipboard

Manual

should provide a list of the applicable publications available on board.

Procedure for ensuring that the up-to-date publications are available should be clearly
defined in this section. An up-to-date master list of all statutory certificates of the
vessel should be available in this section of the manual.

The section on non-conformities, breakdowns and accidents is intended to provide

guidance to master and shipboard personnel on method and form of reports for these
events. The terms ‘accident’, ‘hazardous occurrence’ and ‘non-conformity’ are

defined in tins section. A standard format for reporting should be provided (see Table

4.5, Page 77). This section must contain a dear statement requiring the master to
report accidents and hazardous occurrence, such as;

Fatalities << ^p’apeasotmelpr tiiird praties on board

Incapacitating injury or illness to ship’s personnel or third parties on
board

Fire or explosion

Grounding or stranding
Damage to vessel or equipment
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Damage to other vessels, or property

Cargo contamination and Cargo loss
Pollution or threatened pollution
Malfunction of critical machinery, equipment

Pirate attack

‘Near miss’ incidents

Deviations from drug and alcohol policy requirements
The section on document control in the Main Shipboard Manual should contain

procedures to control all documents related to the safety management system. A

method to ensure that obsolete documents are replaced with current issues must be
explained in this section. A document master list must be available in this section,
indicating holder, location and current revision details of each document.

The ICS ‘Guidelines on the Application of the IMO International Safety Management
Code’ categorises cargo operations on gas, chemical and oil tankers as critical

shipboard operations. The Cargo Handling Manual of a tanker should provide

guidance to ship’s personnel for these critical operations. This manual must contain a
general reference section in which information covering cargoes regularly carried is

provided. The ICS Data Sheets for liquefied gas cargoes and chemical cargoes can
prowde an excellent source of information. It is not necessary to elaborate the hazards

and general safety precautions in this manual however the Tanker Safety Guide

(Petroleum/Chemical/Liquefied Gas) must be incorporated by reference in this
manual. This section must also provide details of ship specific procedure for record
keeping during cargo operations. The next section of the manual should contain

descriptions of the various equipment in the cargo handling system such as;

cargo and ballast lines and valves
cargo/ballast valve control system

pumping plant
-

drying/padding/inerting system
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ISM Code
NON-CONFORMITY REPORT
11.

I PLACT/DATE

I VESSEL:

2. TYPE OF OCCURRENCE

YES

AccidentZInddent
Near Accidcnt/Incident
Inspection “no findings”

3. LOCATION OF NON
CONFORMITY
Vessel
Head Office
Sub Contractor

YES

Pollution

Yes

4. OBSERVED/
DISCOVERED BY:
Flag State Authorities
Port State Authorities
Class
Insurance Company Rep.
Charterer
Vessel Personnel
Ship Manager

YES

5. IMPLICATIONS/CONSEQUENCES

Authorities/Class
Recommendation
Ship Manager
Recommendation

Yes

Yes

Detention

Technical

Personnel Injury
Grounding
Collision
Cargo Claims

Structure/HuU
Safety Equipment
Personnel
Health Condition
Navigation
Communication

6. OBSERVER’S INITIAL EVALUATION
Yes

Yes

Standard Practice
Substandard Condition
Substandard Procedure
Substandard Maintenance

Substandard Qualification
Lack of training
Substandard Routine

Yes

7. SERIOUSNESS OF INJURY/LOSS

Major Loss of life or pennanent/prolonged disablement and/or expenses > $10000
Average Temporarily disabled/off duty/repatriation and/or expenses > $1000
Minor No loss of ability to perform duty and/or expenses < $ 1000

Place/Date:.

Master/Chief Eng. Sign:

Table 4.5
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Source: INTERTANKO

-

emergency shut down system
tank cleaning/clearing system

crude oil washing system (crude oil tankers only)
reliefZvent system

cargo heating/cooling system
reliquefaction plant (gas tankers only)

alcohol injection system (gas tankers only)

-

gas detection systems (where applicable)

The next section of the Cargo Handling Manual should contain checklists, guidelines

and process flow diagrams for key cargo-related operations such as inerting, loading,
venting, discharging, tank cleaning/clearing, gasfreeing, ballasting/deballasting, cargo

heating (oil/chemical tankers). Additionally, for gas tanker, for operations such as

cooling down, gassing up, warm up, cargo conditioning and reliquefaction. These

guidelines should also refer the reader to appropriate ship's drawings, operations
manuals and maintenance manuals for details. The Cargo Handling Manual must be

structured in such a manner that other mandatory operations manuals, such as the
crude oil washing manual, are incorporated in it.

SOLAS Regulation 111/51, prescribes the details of the training manual to be carried
on board vessels. This regulation only requires instructions and information on life

saving appliances provided in the ship and on best methods of survival to be included

in the training manual. The scope of this manual may be expanded to include all safety
and emergency training and drills. This manual may then be called the Shipboard

Safety and Training Manual. Thismanual willonly fulfil tire role of tire SOLAS
Training Manual but it will also cover the function of a Safety Manual. This will
make on-board training consistent with the proposed integrated approach to

shipboard emergency response. SOLAS III/51 requires that:
The following shall be explained in detail:

donning of lifejackets and immersion suits, as appropriate;
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T

muster at assigned stations;
boarding, launching, and clearing the survival craft and
rescue boats;

method of launching from within the survival craft;

release from launching appliance;
methods and use of devices for protection in launching

areas, where appropriate;

illumination in launching areas;
use of all survival equipment;
use of all detection equipment;

with the assistance of illustrations the use of radio life-saving
appliances;
use of drogues;
use of engine and accessories;
recovery of survival craft and rescue boats including

stowage and securing;

hazards of exposure and the need for warm clothing;
best use of survival craft facilities in order to survive;

methods of retrieval, including the use of helicopter rescue

gear (slings, baskets, stretchers), breeches-buoy and shore
life saving apparatus and ship’s line throwing apparatus;

-

all other functions contained in the muster list and
emergency instructions;

instructions for the emergency repair of life-saving ^pliances.
In addition to the list above the Shipboard Safety and Training Manual must explain:
frequency and description of safety drills

alarm signals;
use of fire hoses, nozzles and hydrants;

-

use of portable fire extinguishing equipment;
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use of breathing apparatus, emergency life saving apparatus and oxygen

resuscitator;
use of personal safety equipment and fireman’s outfit;

operation of main and emergency fire pumps;

function of fire detection system;
use and upkeep of hand-held radio transceivers;

-

first aid and emergency medical treatment procedure.

4.3.3 Training
Training is a crucial component in the process of developing controls. It can
determine the success or failure of a well-designed and well-documented safety

management system. Shore-based personnel and ships’ personnel of the Company will
need to be trained in relevant aspects of the safety management system.

Selected personnel from both the shore and shipboard organisation will need to

undergo a course on development and implementation of safety management systems.
They will later constitute the core group that will co-ordinate the development and

implementation process. In order to ensure continuity, these persons must be also

trained as internal auditors of the safety management system.

When the safety management system is initially being introduced in the organisation,
the Company should conduct properly constituted training courses for shore

personnel who are expected to undertake functions related directly to the proposed

safety management system. Such courses will have to be foUowed-up by a period of
on-the-job familiarisation. Ideally, the familiarisation period must comrade with the
testing of the prototype safety management system within the organisation. Drills and

exercises must be utilised to iron out any flaws in the system and
opportunities.

80

as training

Once the safety management system is established and operating successfully, shore
based personnel will require refresher courses, at regular intervals, to update them

with any proposed major changes. Hus pre-supposes that no major change to the
safety management system will be undertaken without preparatory training. Newly-

appointed persons and persons who are newly-assigned duties related to the safety
management system must undergo a familiarisation programme before assuming

charge of their duties. This programme could be a combination of the following:

reading (and acknowledging for record) all safety management system
documentation;

computer based familiarisation programme;
video instructions;
on-the-job training.

Safety management training programmes for shipboard personnel should have a
functional approach. Three levels of training will need to be devised. The three levels
are:
management level

-

master and senior officers

operational level

-

watchkeeping officers/engineers

support level

-

crew members

It is necessary that ship’s officers from the management level are formally briefed by

the Company, prior to their joining the vessel. The briefing must include:

overview of the safety management system;
-

specific details of the safety management system on board the vessel;

reading all safety management system documentation;

computer based familiarisation programme;
video instructions;
-

stipulations of minimum hand-over periods.
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The safety management familiarisation programme for ship’s personnel from the
supervisory level should include:
provision of a Ship Safety Handbook containing relevant information about

the ship, the safety management system and safety and pollution prevention
precautions (see Table 4.6);
reading all relevant shipboard safety management system documentation;

computer based familiarisation programme;

video instructions;

stipulations of minimum hand-over periods.

The safety management familiarisation programme for ship’s personnel from the

support level should include:
provision of a Ship Safety Handbook containing relevant information about

the ship, the safety management system and safety and pollution prevention

precautions (see Table 4.6);
video instructions.
The

shore-based personnel department must maintain a record of all safety

management training undergone by personnel. The Company should seek to rotate the
same personnel back on the same ships so as to provide continuity to the safety

management system.

When developing the Ship Safety Handbook the Company may take guidance from
the following publications of the International Chamber of Shipping:
• Safety in Oil Tankers
• Safety in Chemical Tankers

• Safety in Liquefied Gas Tankers

Following is the table of contents of the proposed Ship Safety Handbook:
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SHIP SAFETY HANDBOOK
Table of Contents

1.0 Safety and Environment Policy
2.0 Ship’s Particulars
3.0 Organisation chart
4.0 Safety and Pollution Hazards & Precautions
5.0 Safety and Pollution Prevention Practices

Table 4.6

4.4

Implementing the Safety Management System

A pre-requisite to successful implementation of the safety management system is that
personnel from all relevant departments of the organisation must participate in the
development process. This will ensure that the system proposed to be introduced is

broadly compatible with the existing systems. Another benefit is that the personnel
will develop a sense of ownership of the proposed system and thus there will be little
or no resistance to change to the new system.

A realistic implementation time schedule will need to be developed. To a certain
extent, activities such as developing systems, training and communication can run

concurrently. It will normally take 12 to 18 months to establish a safety management

system.

Every available effective means of communication must be utilised by the Company to
communicate the intent to establish a formal safety management system. A
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combination of seminars, poster campaign, newsletters and fleet orders/circulars may
be used. The objective of communication should be not only to inform but to make

the personnel receptive to change.

Various aspects of the system should be introduced into the organisation in a phased
manner. The first step should be to ensure that all the necessary documents are held at

every location in the system. The proposed document control protocol must then be
introduced for safety management documentation. Procedural modifications can then
be effected to ensure that procedures followed are in keeping with the safety

management manuals. The system must then be allowed to operate for a reasonable

period of time, without any attempt to present it for certification. During this period
internal auditors should function both as facilitators and auditors. Any flaws in the
system must be exposed and promptly corrected. Unscheduled audits must be

undertaken to ensure conformance with defined parameters. Once the system is
confirmed to be functioning satisfactorily, certification can be sought.

4.5

Monitoring the Safety Management System

Once the safety management system is in place, it is necessary to monitor the system
so as to ensure that the effectiveness of the system is maintained. As shown in Fig.

4.1, there are two aspects to monitoring — pro-active and reactive monitoring.

4.5.1 Pro-Active Monitoring
Internal audit is the key method of pro-active monitoring. The audit must cover the
ship and every shore-based department with functions directly defined in the safety
management system documentation. The internal audit is done by selected employees

of the Company. The audit team (see Section 3.3.4) should conduct the audit in a

structured manner, in accordance with the documented procedure in the Main
Company Manual, to determine the adequacy of controls and degree of compliance.
The audit will involve an inspection of safety management records and interview of
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personnel. The audit must also serve as a method of confirming that personnel

comprehend the requirements. The audit should initiate remedial action for

deficiencies observed. Typically, internal audits must be conducted at least once every
year. Additional internal audits may be required after major alterations have been
made in the safety management system.

The audit team may consist of around three members. The team must have an

formally identified leader. The audit program and schedule must be prepared by the
team leader, in consultation with the rest of the team, after considering time

constraints such as vessel’s commercial schedule. Any department being audited must
be notified well in advance. The audit team must familiarise themselves with

department/ship-specific documentation before the audit. Previous audit results must
be reviewed.

The audit should commence with a pre-audit meeting. During this meeting the audit
team leader will explain the scope and basis of the audit to key personnel in the area

being audited. The audit team will also receive relevant information fi’om these
personnel regarding the area being audited. This meeting should be used to encourage

free flow of communication between the auditors and the personnel in the area being
audited.

During the audit, the audit team will seek objective evidence that the prescribed

procedure is being followed. A record of compliance and non-compliance will be

maintained by the audit team in a manner prescribed in the Main Company Manual.
The audit should conclude with a post-audit meeting in which a summary of findings
is formally presented to the head of department or the master of the ship, as

applicable.
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A formal audit report should be made and filed by the audit team. A copy of this
report should be presented to the chief executive of the Company. Audit reports must

be reviewed during the periodic review of the safety management system by the top
management.

4.5.2 Reactive Monitoring
Every accident, near miss or unsafe condition points towards the inadequacy of the
safety management system. Reporting and investigation is a form of reactive

monitoring which seeks to eliminate these inadequacies.

The master of the vessel will normally be responsible for reporting the event. The

report must include information about how the event developed and how it was finally

resolved. The report must also establish;
time/date of event;
personnel involved in event;

status of machinery during the event;
damage to equipment;
time-event record.
INCIDENT

LACK OF

BASIC

CONTROL

CAUSES

CAUSES

2.1NADEQUATE

PERSONAL

SUB

CONTACT

PEOPLE

PROGRAM
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WITH

PROPERTY
PROCESSES

IMMEDIATE

LOSS

1.INADEQUATE
PROGRAM

STANDARDS

ACTS

ENERGY

3.INADEQUATE

JOB

&

OR

COMPLIANCE

FACTORS

CONDITIONS

SUBSTANCE

TO
STANDARDS

Table 4.7
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The Company should conduct an investigation based upon the report of accident, near
miss or unsafe condition. The objective of this investigation will be to develop

remedial measures to prevent recurrence of the event. The event must be analysed
during investigations to establish the cause - not to affix the blame. The International
Loss Control Institute’s (ILCI) loss causation model, as outlined by Sagen (1993, 4),

provides an efficient tool for accident/incident investigation. The ILCI concept can be
used to establish the immediate cause and basic cause of an event (see Table 4.7).

Examples of causes are:

Immediate CausesSub-standard act:

- Operating equipment without qualifications
- Using equipment improperly

- Using defective equipment
- Failure to warn or secure before operation
- Failed to use personal protective equipment

properly
- Personnel not fit for duty (alcohol, fatigue, etc.)

Sub-standard condition:

- Defective tools, equipment or materials
- Fire or explosion hazard
- Inadequate ventilation or illumination
- Inadequate protective equipment

Basic CausesPersonal Factors:

- Inadequate capability (physical/physiological)

- Lack of knowledge
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- Lack of skill
- Stress/fatigue

- Improper motivation
Job Factors;

- Inadequate leadership
- Inadequate engineering

- inadequate purchasing
- inadequate maintenance

- inadequate tools and equipment
- wear and tear

The investigation must result in the reinforcement of safety management controls in

cases where it found that controls were inadequate. Where prescribed procedures

were not complied with, personnel will need to be re-trained. Disciplinary proceedings
against personnel should only be used as a last resort.

A record of the investigation and its outcome must be maintained. These records will
help in identifying any latent trend. Lessons learnt from such investigation may be

communicated to relevant personnel within the organisation or utilised in training
programmes identity of personnel involved may be protected).

4.6

Review of the Safety Management System

The safety management system is required to fenction within a dynamic environment.

Legislations, codes, standards and regulations are likely to change. The results of
audits, investigations and surveys will provide new information. The periodic review

conducted by the Company must consider all these matters. The periodic review must

be conducted acccording to the defined procedure in the Main Company Manual. The
outcome of the review must be meticulously documented.
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The certification and verification of the safety management system by the Flag State

Administration or its appointed agencies fulfil the function of an additional external

periodic review of the safety management system.

4.7

Cost-benefit of Safety Management

It is natural for a shipping company embarking on an ISM Code implementation
program to ponder the cost implication. Ward (1995, 11) recounts an old chestnut to
justify the cost of safety management. ‘If you think safety is expensive, you should see

the cost of an accident.’

An increasing number of Port States are imposing astronomical fines for the

infiingement of pollution requirements, and are strictly enforcing the Port State
Control provisions of International Conventions. Undoubtedly, it is becoming more

expensive to operate an unsafe ship than a safe ship.

Safety and pollution prevention are functions of management control. More than 80%

of all accidents are attributed to human-related and/or operational causes. Safety

management provides loss control measures for this segment of accidental loss. The

expense incurred in safety management is to be viewed as an investment in loss

control. The investment in safety management will vary from company to company,
depending on the present status of their safety organisation.

It is important to realise that there are certain unquantifiable benefits to be derived '
from safety management in shipping, namely, avoidance of human tragedy, prevention

of environmental damage, and averting the loss of corporate reputation and

credibility.

There is tangible evidence of the contnbution of safety management to the bottom line

of a shipping company in the report (Lloyd’s List, 8 December 1994), that companies
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who have introduced safety management have achieved 10% reduction in company

liability insurance; 6 - 8% reduction in P&I insurance; 37% fall in lost man-hours; a
27% reduction in hospitalised personnel and a 40% reduction in medical sign-offs.

Evidently the benefits to be derived fi'om safety management outweigh the cost of

implementation.
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5.0

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The requirements of the Code do not amount to a mere formality,
like the renewal of a statutory certificate or similar document which
can be swiftly obtained by a fee changing hands. It requires
executive decisions, thought and strategies. It needs commitment
of financial and manpower resources.
‘No defence’, Lloyd’s List
5 June 1995

The ISM Code is expected to enter into force on 1 July 1998. It is not premature to

comment upon the safety management movement in the shipping industry. Misgivings
exist about the future of the ISM Code. Protagonists of the ISM Code have
unconditionally heralded it as a panacea for all ills that befall the shipping industry.

Doubting Thomases tend to dismiss the ISM Code’s influence on shipping standards
as minimal. The reality is likely to lie somewhere in between.

Undoubtedly, the safety management movement in general and the ISM Code in

particular are momentous developments in the shipping industry. The Code can prove
to be the watershed in industry-wide safety attitudes provided there is total
commitment from all concerned. Safety management in shipping must surpass the

function of a mandatory requirement and assume the role of a credo within the
shipping industry. Ward (1995,12) warns:

As with all management systems the ISM Code is only as good as
the sum of its parts. If at any stage ary one of the involved parties

do not accept the tenets of the Code, or does not embrace the
requisite commitment with an almost evangelical zeal, the
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inevitable result will be an expensive waste of time, energy and

resources and will lead to the collapse of the ISM Code and its
ethos.

Shipping companies. Flag State Administrations, Port States, Classification, P&I
Clubs and Underwriters, and Charterers all have an equally important role to play in

ensuring the success of the ISM Code.

This study has revealed a number of elements highlighted below. The conclusions of
this investigation are:

The ISM Code is a direct result of the recognition that decisions made ashore

by the owner/operator can jeopardise the safety and undermine the pollution
prevention standards of a ship at sea. The Code will rein in the profligate
practices of irresponsible shipowners/operators.

The requirements of the ISM Code are a refreshing departure from the

classical approach of prescriptive regulations for construction, equipment and
operations. Implementation of the Code may entail systemic changes in certain

'

organisations and in some extreme cases a complete change in the operational
philosophy.

-

Although the ISM Code is predominantly an externally determined code for

safety management, bearing resemblance to ISO 9000 series Quality

Standards, there is a strain of Total Quality Management in the obligation to
ensure continuous improvement of safety management skills of personnel

ashore and on board ships.

-{

Top management of a shipping company has an instrumental role in the
success of the safety management system. The commitment of the top

\management will serve as the fount of safety culture in the organisation.
An in-depth understanding of the human element in maritime safety and

pollution prevention is essential to ensure the formulation of effective safety
management strategies in a shipping company.
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In the short term, the process of implementation of the ISM Code on board
and ashore may contribute to an increase in work load for the ships’ stafif,
shipmasters, superintendents and shore managers. However, in the long term it

will provide a well-defined, safe work environment in which fillfilling

procedures of the Code will not entail additional work.

It is strongly recommended that:
Shipping companies initiate the development of a company specific safety

management system as soon as practicable; they should not postpone this
development until the final moment (1 July 1998).

Shipping companies avoid off-the-shelf safety management solutions provided

by consultants, although these may serve the short term need of mandatory
compliance, because these solutions will tend to be static in nature.

Shipping companies do not attempt to substitute training and experience of its

shipboard personnel with a plethora of checklists and guidelines. Too many
checklists and guidelines can stifle the initiative of the seafarer, which may
prove to be dangerous.
Flag State Administrations do not dilute the requirements of the ISM Code in
order to attract tonnage to their respective registries and avoid migration of

tonnage to more amenable flags. This does not however mean that

the

Administrations must adopt the old prescriptive regulatory regime.
Classification societies abandon the practice of acting as consultants for ISM

Code Certification, either directly or through their subsidiaries. In many cases.
Classification Societies will be conducting verifications of the Company and its
vessels, for the DOC and SMC, on behalf of the Flag States. Most leading

Classification Societies are themselves, or through their subsidiaries, acting as
consultants to shipowners for ISM Code certification. There is likely to be a

conflict of interest.
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Port States enforce the requirements of the ISM Code rigidly and assist in
weeding out non-complying ships and their companies.
P&I Clubs play a major role through their membership and peer group

pressure for ensuring compliance with the ISM Code.

Charterers do not employ

vessels which do not fulfil applicable codes,

guidelines, standards and regulations in letter and spirit.
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